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 EXECUTIVE EXPOSURE: GOVERNMENT SECRETS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND PLATFORMS FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
 
Adam M. Samaha* 
 
[53 UCLA L. Rev. _ (2006 forthcoming)] 
 
 American law never reached a satisfying conclusion about public 
access to information on government operations.  But recent events are 
prompting reconsideration.  As our current system is reassessed, three 
shortfalls in past debates should be overcome.  The first involves igno-
rance of foreign systems.  Other democracies grapple with information 
access problems, and their recent experiments are illuminating.  Indeed 
they expose two additional domestic weaknesses.  One is a line we have 
drawn within constitutional law.  Courts and commentators tend to 
treat constitutional issues of public access separately from those of ex-
ecutive discretion to withhold information.  These matters should be 
seen as parts of an integrated system.  When they are, it is difficult to 
constitutionalize one without the other.  The final deficiency concerns 
the boundary between constitutional and ordinary law.  In a very 
practical sense, constitutional law and judicial intervention in this field 
should turn on the character of non-constitutional law—whether non-
judicial actors have built an adequate “platform” for judicial action.  
That connection is not obvious, but a defensible access system is impos-
sible without confronting it.  This Article aims to remedy these three 
mistakes, and it presents a method for evaluating judicial platforms in 
the information access context and beyond. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 American law never reached a satisfying conclusion about public 
access to information on government operations.  But recent events are 
prompting reconsideration.  Clandestine executive efforts to combat 
terrorism have dramatized tensions between secrecy and accountabil-
ity.1  At the same time, reporters persist in cultivating confidential 
sources, and vice versa.  For example, the informal network of White 
House officials and mass media journalists was the vehicle for exposing 
Valerie Plame as a CIA operative.  The Plame affair raised serious con-
cerns about the tradition of extralegal discretion to disclose informa-
tion, as well as the judgment of journalists who enter confidential 
source relationships.2  Meanwhile, the formal law of information access 
is also under stress.  With critics worried that existing law is too weak 
or too strong or both, Congress occasionally entertains serious reform 
proposals.  Some of these proposals aim to protect government-held in-
formation,3 others would codify a journalist-source privilege or bolster 
statutory rights to disclosure.4 
 What should public access norms look like?  Through which institu-
tions should they operate?  The United States is not the only country 
                                                 
1 See infra Part I.A. 
2 See, e.g., Richard B. Schmitt, Journalist Jailed for Not Revealing Source to Court, L.A. TIMES, 
July 7, 2005, at A1 (describing Judith Miller’s decision to disobey a court order that she testify 
before a grand jury investigating the leak); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 
964, 965 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005). 
3 See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. § 661(f) (2005) (seeking to 
ensure that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission may issue rules to protect classified informa-
tion regarding a risk-assessment study); Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act, H.R. 173, 109th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 233 (2005) (proposing to protect port information, including some now public, 
that might increase vulnerability). 
4 See, e.g., Free Flow of Information Act, S. 340, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4, 7(1) (2005) (pro-
posing to grant certain information gatherers a privilege against revealing their sources in fed-
eral proceedings); OPEN Government Act, S. 394, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (2005) (proposing to 
enhance time limits on agency responses); Faster FOIA Act, S. 589, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005). 
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facing these questions.  Every government is confronted with them.  
Every society, moreover, develops a system for disseminating informa-
tion about government operations.  No functioning state can withhold 
all such information.  Neither can a government of any significant size 
be perfectly transparent to all of its citizens.  The live choices are about 
the system’s details—including the mixture of formal law and informal 
relationships, the circumstances for public access and official secrecy, 
and the opportunities for executive discretion and judicial intervention. 
 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many aspiring democracies 
have responded to public access issues with constitutional law and ju-
dicial review.5  Whatever informal access mechanisms exist in those 
countries, they are supplemented with fundamental law enforced by 
courts.  In apparent contrast, U.S. courts have sometimes indicated that 
public access is a matter for executive and legislative discretion.6  “The 
Constitution itself,” in Justice Stewart’s words, “is neither a Freedom of 
Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.”7  The D.C. Circuit deliv-
ered a similar message when it ratified a refusal to disclose information 
about post-9/11 detainees.8  And several prominent scholars have essen-
tially agreed.9  Indeed, there are powerful objections to the judiciary de-
signing a system of access and secrecy for the rest of government.10  
True, federal courts might be usefully detached from the desires of in-
cumbent officials and the schemes of their opponents.  But judicial ex-
                                                 
5 See infra Part I.B. 
6 See, e.g., Houtchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.); 
id. at 16 & n.* (Stewart, J., concurring) (recognizing accommodation rights for the press but not-
ing that “[f]orces and factors other than the Constitution must determine what government-
held data are to be made available to the public”). 
7 Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press”, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975) (emphasis added). 
8 See Center for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 934 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003) (“[D]isclosure of government information generally is left to the ‘political forces’ that 
govern a democratic republic.”), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004). 
9 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 80–81, 86–87 (1975) (relying on poli-
tics and leaks to the press); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 76 (1985); Ronald 
Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the First Amendment?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 4, 1980, at 49, 51–52 
(leaving open situations in which an agency arbitrarily denies all information about its opera-
tions); see also LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 146 (1991) (warning against “the mas-
siveness of the enterprise of developing a general newsgathering right”); DAVID M. O’BRIEN, 
THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 40, 166–67 (1981); 
Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 
68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 514 (1980) (arguing that the Constitution offers no principled basis for adju-
dicating access claims); cf. Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking 
Freedom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government Infor-
mation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690, 731 (1984) (demanding “reasonable grounds . . . to believe that 
the President or executive officials are using secrecy to cover up violations of federal law”). 
10 By “system” I mean a set of components that should be seen as interrelated.  Cf. SUNNY Y. 
AUYANG, FOUNDATIONS OF COMPLEX SYSTEM THEORIES: IN ECONOMICS, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, 
AND STATISTICAL PHYSICS 151, 154–55 (1998) (distinguishing system from collective analysis).  I 
concentrate on the system of public access to information about the federal executive branch. 
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pertise is limited.  An acceptable system must reconcile competing in-
terests and wrestle with the reality that information often is obtained 
through informal channels.  So perhaps U.S. courts do, and should, 
bow out.11 
 Our story is not so simple, however.  Consider information about 
the executive branch of the federal government.  We now have a statu-
tory, administrative, and judicial system to evaluate public access de-
mands—including the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),12 the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),13 the Government in the 
Sunshine Act,14 the Presidential Records Act,15 the Federal Records 
Act,16 and the Executive Order on classified information.17  Federal 
courts regularly use such material to adjudicate access disputes. 
 Moreover, U.S. courts do not treat the existing access system as a 
Constitution-free zone.  They have restricted access claims that threaten 
executive functions by pointing to implications of constitutional struc-
ture.  If such restraints on access claims are justifiable (and they are), 
then what about modifications of other kinds?  In fact, might constitu-
tional inferences support enhanced public access to government infor-
mation, even if the Constitution is best read to require no access claims 
in the first place?  This question points to a broader issue: whether there 
are situations in which courts may draw on constitutional norms only 
after some other institution creates a platform for their intervention.  
My answer is a cautious yes.  Sometimes courts should neither design 
nor prompt a new system, yet they should be free to elaborate on a sys-
tem initiated by others.  Information access systems are one example.  
This Article offers a way to think about others. 
                                                 
11 Important alternative perspectives include Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First 
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 602–11 [hereinafter Blasi, Checking]; Thomas I. 
Emerson, The First Amendment and the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14; and Cass R. Sun-
stein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889 (1986).  See also MARK G. YUDOF, 
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 246–55 
(1983); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 
489–95 (1985); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 927 (1992) (supporting special access privileges for the press); Steven Helle, The News-
gathering/Publication Dichotomy and Government Expression, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1, 4, 52–59 (arguing 
for a robust constitutional duty of government to disclose information); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy 
in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 
HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 95 (2004) (advocating access in the deportation context); Barry P. 
McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to 
Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249 (2004) (arguing for information 
gathering rights but limited to certain categories of gatherers). 
12 5 U.S.C. § 552 (enacted by Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966)). 
13 5 U.S.C. App. 2 §§ 1 et seq. (enacted by Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972)). 
14 5 U.S.C. § 552b (enacted by Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976)). 
15 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2207 (enacted by Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (1978)). 
16 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101 et seq. (enacted by Pub. L. No. 90-620, 82 Stat. 1297 (1968)). 
17 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 (Mar. 25, 2003).  
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 The analysis proceeds in three parts and makes three principal con-
tributions.  Part I offers reasons for incorporating information access 
norms into law, including constitutional law.  Democratic governance 
is premised on some measure of public access to information about 
government operations.  Laws aimed at regulating information access 
help achieve an acceptable measure of exposure, without jeopardizing 
executive efficacy or unduly relying on each official’s personal prefer-
ences.  Indeed, these norms are good candidates for constitutionaliza-
tion and even judicial enforcement.  Although largely overlooked in 
this country, many recently drafted national constitutions make a 
commitment to public access and state secrecy.  In addition, some for-
eign constitutional courts demand disclosure even without an explicit 
public access provision.  These judicial forays into the access field have 
been episodic and measured; their preference for sharing responsibility 
with other institutions is pragmatic and suggestive; and their lessons 
have not been assessed in the law literature. 
 Part II turns to our own constitutional order.  Few courts have en-
dorsed a general constitutional norm of access to government informa-
tion.  Instead, the U.S. Constitution has been read to imply official 
discretion to withhold certain information.  The most obvious example is 
the doctrine of executive privilege but less recognized instances occur 
in FOIA and FACA cases.  Not all court-generated constitutional law 
inhibits public access, however.  Openness in many judicial proceed-
ings is guaranteed.  And private parties are fairly free to disseminate in-
formation that happens to escape from government sources.  Scholars 
have identified each of these constitutional positions, but their coexis-
tence is underexplored—and problematic.18  The theoretical defense for 
one piece sometimes clashes with the justification for another.  And 
there is a persuasive structural argument, grounded in democratic 
premises and skepticism about official motives, which would add pub-
lic access to the list of constitutional norms. 
 Why has our settlement lasted?  The given reasons are basically 
pragmatic.  Concerns about institutional competence have become 
                                                 
18 For exceptional efforts to analyze more than one component of this scheme, see Sunstein, 
supra note 11, at 905–09 (critiquing the combination of modest speech rights for public employ-
ees with minimal public access rights and constraints on government control of truthful infor-
mation, such as weapons technology); Blasi, Checking, supra note 11, at 602–11 (supporting a 
reporter’s privilege along with information access rights); and Lillian R. BeVier, Like Mackerel in 
the Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 314–15, 339 
(1982) (identifying difficulties in reconciling court-access guarantees with prior access cases).  
See also Cheh, supra note 9, at 709–12 (arguing for enhanced government employee speech 
rights but limited judicial review of administrative systems to ensure secrecy).  Thomas Emer-
son, supra note 11, deserves credit for helping us see the interests in gathering, disseminating, 
and receiving information as an integrated system of constitutional significance. 
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stock arguments against constitutionalizing public access.  First, it has 
been asserted that the judiciary lacks easily ascertainable standards for 
specifying the content of any access guarantee.  Second, alternative 
methods are available to mediate access disputes, such as statutory 
claims and cultivation of sources by a competitive news media.  Public 
access, therefore, might be a constitutional value that is rightly under-
enforced by the judiciary.19 
 Even these reasons are difficult to accept on second thought.  Heavy 
reliance on informal access networks is now quite controversial and 
always came with a price.  However essential these networks are for 
revealing deep secrets, they are only one part of a healthy access sys-
tem.20  But the problem for the status quo is more serious than popular 
skepticism about today’s journalists and their official patrons.  Rather 
than point in the same direction, arguments about nonjudicial alterna-
tives can collide with the presumption of judicial incompetence.  Part 
III explores this idea.  Congress and the executive have constructed a 
system for analyzing a large number of access claims.  This system 
enlists the judiciary.  Perhaps no court could have designed that access 
system, nor ordered anyone else to do so.  But once an access system is 
up and running, judicial improvisation becomes practically easier.  In 
other words, the United States has a platform for judicial intervention 
into access disputes.  The issue is whether the judicial role is restricted 
to implementation of the system as given, within the confines of ordi-
nary statutory work, or whether courts are empowered to modify it fur-
ther.  This issue has had no serious treatment in the law literature.21 
                                                 
19 See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL PRACTICE 6 (2004) (“There is and should be a gap between the Constitution itself and the 
judicially enforced Constitution.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE 
SPEECH 106–07 (1993) (suggesting that access to government information is a judicially underen-
forced First Amendment norm, and FOIA as a reasonable response); David A. Strauss, Persua-
sion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 358–59 (1991) (similar). 
20 See infra Part I.A.; text accompanying notes 167–179. 
21 In a paragraph of his influential piece, Emerson noted that information access statutes 
provide “a good start” in defining the scope of a defensible constitutional right.  Emerson, supra 
note 11, at 17; cf. THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 138–39 (1992) 
(drawing on in camera proceedings in FOIA litigation to support judicial intervention in for-
eign affairs cases).  Outside the access field, Lawrence Sager recently has pressed the notion 
that “[c]onstitutional judges are part of a contemporary partnership with popular governmental 
actors which promises more complete constitutional justice than could be realized by the courts 
alone.”  SAGER, supra note 19, at 7.  Sager goes on to contend that sometimes courts should en-
force minimum welfare rights “once other institutions of government have acted and created 
contexts in which the issue of right surfaces largely unencumbered by other questions.”  Id. at 
95; cf. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 935–37 
(2003) (explaining experimentalist courts and “big” cases involving complexity as opposed to 
“hard” cases of fundamental disagreement).  It is this kind of collaboration that I will explore, 
but I distinguish welfare rights below.  See infra text accompanying notes 296–297. 
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We ought to hesitate at this opportunity.  Under certain circum-
stances, however, the judiciary should elaborate constitutional law 
from constitutionally optional platforms.  Such action demands a le-
gitimate constitutional mission, a practical obstacle to independent ju-
dicial intervention, an existing system that helps solve the problem, and 
assessment of resulting risks.22  Forerunners do exist,23 but the plat-
forms model is admittedly unorthodox.  It requires an unconvention-
ally soft boundary between ordinary and constitutional law, which is a 
notion that contemporary scholars are only beginning to mine.24  In any 
event, the possibilities are attractive.  We might achieve a democracy-
promoting role for the courts that is legitimate, desirable, and feasible—
a role that is within the domain of constitutional value, that does not 
rely on unrealistic hopes for action by other institutions, but that ame-
liorates serious difficulties associated with unassisted structural reform 
and unbridled policymaking.25 
 
I. SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY 
 The individual provisions of the United States Constitution say little 
about government secrecy or public access.26  If constitutional law 
reaches either one, it is due to reasoning of a different kind.  The argu-
ments are structural and institutional, involving the proper relationship 
between citizen and government and a reliable system for resolving 
tension between openness and efficacy.  So it helps to begin with gen-
eral thinking on secrecy and democracy. 
 
A. Access Assumptions 
 Like other forms of government, modern democracies seek legiti-
macy—as in a social condition in which the government’s power is 
thought to be justified and worthy of respect.27  But they do so in a par-
                                                 
22 See infra Part III.C.3. 
23 See infra Part III.C.2. 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 246–249 (comparing and contrasting platforms with 
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn’s “super statutes” and Gerhard Casper’s “framework leg-
islation”). 
25 Contrast the assertive model for judicial action in Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12, 17, 27–28, 33–34, 43–46, 57–58 (1979) (recognizing difficulties in 
court-orchestrated structural reform but defending it in light of the alternatives and the as-
serted expertise of courts in giving meaning to constitutional values), and Owen M. Fiss, 
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083 (1984). 
26 See infra Part II.B. 
27 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME 
& JUST. 283, 308 (2003) (defining legitimacy as “a quality possessed by an authority, a law, or an 
institution that leads others to feel obligated to obey its decisions and directives”); see also Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795–96 (2005) (de-
scribing strong and weak senses of “sociological” legitimacy); cf. David A. Strauss, Reply: 
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ticular way.  Democracies promise responsiveness and accountability to 
popular will, rather than claim obedience by divine right or the threat 
of overwhelming force.28  Citizens will appreciably influence the direc-
tion of government, and they will have an opportunity to assess pro-
gress and assign blame.29  This influence is plainly limited, however.  
Some popular demands might be declared out of bounds without the 
government losing its fundamentally democratic character;30 actual, in-
dividual consent to government authority is not the strategy or even a 
coherent prospect;31 and existing democracies do not permit people to 
“govern themselves” in a strong sense.  They retain perceptible lines 
between government and the governed, with the former sometimes co-
ercing the latter.  These governments garner legitimacy by maintaining 
an adequate connection between, not the fusion of, public and private 
forces. 
 There are many ways to accomplish this.  Familiar models include 
representative, deliberative, participatory, and direct democracy.32  
Each has a different aspiration for the form and intensity of private in-
volvement in governance.  Some theories view democracy as a method 
of accurately exposing and registering the preferences of often-
uninterested voters; others want democratic institutions to function as 
forums for the articulation and alteration of private interests, toward 
the formation of public-regarding individuals.  Important features are 
common to all of them, however.  Consider the widespread adoption of 
voting rights with broad-based adult suffrage, plus serious limits on 
                                                                                                                                
Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1861 (2005) (“[I]n constitutional debates, an as-
sertion of illegitimacy is generally used, and should only be used, to make a certain kind of 
moral claim: that a government action is not entitled to a full measure of obedience.”). 
28 On the evolution of democracy at the national level, see, for example, ROBERT A. DAHL, 
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989).  For a compatible argument that majoritarian political ac-
countability should be seen as just one mechanism for protecting liberty, see Rebecca L. Brown, 
Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998). 
29 See, e.g., 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (Nov. 24, 1794) (statement of Rep. Madison) (“If we ad-
vert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the 
people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.”); cf. James Wilson, 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 1, 1787) (“[T]he sovereignty resides in the people.”), in 1 
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 265 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION]. 
30 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from abridging “the freedom” of 
speech); id. amend. XV, § 1 (guaranteeing citizens’ right to vote against denial on account of 
race).  But cf. id. art. V (authorizing “Amendments to this Constitution”). 
31 Accord RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 30–31 (2004); Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 226 (1980). 
32 See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 
xiv–xv, 117 (1984); THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFEREN-
DUM, AND RECALL (1989); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREE-
MENT (1996); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 154 (2003); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 6–7, 239–43 (2001). 
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government authority to punish a person’s beliefs, expression, or asso-
ciation on matters of politics.33 
Such core elements in a genuine program of popular accountability 
require a system for disclosing information about government.34  With-
out meaningful information on government plans, performance, and 
officers, the ability to vote, speak, and organize around political causes 
becomes rather empty.  One will have a difficult time assessing the in-
cumbent administration in the absence of information concerning reve-
nue, spending, and the progress of government initiatives.  Only the 
most modest understanding of the citizen’s role in politics—
retrospective voting on passive experience—might do without such in-
formation access.  This understanding could itself foreclose the gov-
ernment’s democratic legitimacy. 
 But does a system of public access need any specialized law to suc-
ceed?  To what extent does democracy require a formal system for access 
to information, with rules speaking directly to the matter and institu-
tions reserved for effectuating those rules?  Should we instead rely on 
an informal system arising from incentives and interests that are un-
hitched to any access law per se?  There is good reason to think that 
some formal law is helpful, although the conclusion is not a quick one. 
Take the executive branch.  It is headed by an elected President and 
populated by tax-paid employees.  They can be seen as agents of the 
public charged with acting for the public’s benefit.35  Many might take 
that role seriously as a matter of personal honor or ethics.  Without ef-
fective monitoring, however, some of these officials will be work-shy, 
careless, corrupt, or otherwise willing to abuse the power afforded by 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 95, 97–98 (2003) (discussing Council of Europe members); Lloyd N. Cutler, The 
Internationalization of Human Rights, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 578. 
34 See FRANCIS E. ROURKE, SECRECY AND PUBLICITY: DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY 4–5, 39–40 
(1961) (asserting government’s interest in influencing opinion formation and posing govern-
ment secrecy as a threat to public observation and control); Emerson, supra note 11, at 14; see 
also James Madison, Letter to W.T. Berry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (lauding a public education program and stating, 
“[a] popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a 
prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or both”); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELA-
TION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948) (“Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide 
an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism 
which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning 
for the general good.”); GUTMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 95–101 (discussing the publicity 
principle, traceable in some form to both Bentham and Kant, as a presumption to promote de-
mocratic accountability); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1982). 
35 See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 24 (1980). 
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their government positions.36  Indeed, if they want to retain power and 
are given unrestrained discretion to manage information access, we 
might expect them to disclose information that makes the administra-
tion look public spirited, effective, and efficient, but withhold informa-
tion to the contrary.37  This story accords with well-known examples of 
executive efforts to do questionable business behind closed doors—
such as President Johnson’s spin on military progress in Vietnam, the 
Nixon administration’s Watergate scandal, the Reagan administration’s 
Iran-Contra affair, and the health care and energy policy task forces 
during the Clinton and second Bush administrations.38  Some part or all 
of these efforts became public, of course, but that is cold comfort.  If the 
desire to mislead via control over information access persists, is there 
good reason to believe that the desire will be thwarted systematically 
rather than episodically? 
 There surely can be impediments to excessive executive secrecy 
without any access law.  Some government operations are so visible 
that the public need not rely on official representations, at least to judge 
outcomes.  Federal income tax paid by an individual is one instance.  
Second, some high-ranking officials will not pursue a single-minded 
agenda of political entrenchment.  Some will act on what they perceive 
to be the dictates of conscience or the needs of the public good, includ-
ing the revelation of bad news.  More important, the U.S. has an active 
though informal system of information access.  Unauthorized disclo-
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF 
INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 956, 992 (Gunther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (“This superiority 
of the professional insider every bureaucracy seeks further to increase through the means of 
keeping secret its knowledge and intentions.”); cf. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVI-
DENCE 524 (1978) [1827] (discussing trials and asserting that “[w]ithout publicity, all other 
checks are insufficient”); LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE 
IT 92 (1913) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.”). 
37 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics (Part I), 47 
AMERICAN ECONOMIST 6, 26 (Fall 2003) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Information] (noting that transpar-
ency can disclose mistakes and corruption); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, On Liberty, the Right to 
Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency in Public Life, in GLOBALIZING RIGHTS: THE 
OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1999, at 115 (Matthew J. Gibney ed., 2003) [hereinafter Stiglitz, 
Transparency]; Christina E. Wells, “National Security” Information and the Freedom of Information 
Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2004). 
38 Other examples include internal executive assessments about the need for Japanese in-
ternment, and the government’s radiation experiments on unconsenting Americans—stories 
that came out long after the fact.  See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417–19 
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting a writ of coram nobis); Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu in 
Support of Petitioners 17–20, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); William Lanouette, Reporting 
on Risk: Who Decides What’s News?, 5 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T, 223, 230–32 (1994); Nestor 
M. Davidson, Note, Constitutional Mass Torts: Sovereign Immunity and the Human Radiation Ex-
periments, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (1996); see also Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Mili-
tary Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 
263–64 (2002) (relating the FBI’s good fortune in learning about Nazi saboteurs who had en-
tered the country during World War II).  
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sure is possible and even routine.39  Whistleblowing and leaking pro-
duced vivid mass media exposure of detention practices at the Abu 
Ghraib prison and on Guantanamo Bay.40  In addition, the possibility of 
leaks should dampen enthusiasm ex ante for secrecy among high-
ranking officials.  Public perceptions of a cover-up can result in severe 
political consequences, and government officials surely value the first 
opportunity to frame the significance of a revelation.  Even the most 
craven executive official might then consider not only the benefit of se-
crecy, but also the risk of unauthorized disclosure, the costs of minimiz-
ing it, and the upside of preemptive disclosure. 
Finally, competitive politics might promote openness.  When aspir-
ing officeholders face off in elections, they could compete away their 
authority to withhold information.  This prospect has been seriously 
doubted, however.41  While voters have reason to fear shirking and 
cheating, they might lack a reliable mechanism for detecting breaches 
of access promises,42 one candidate will have difficulty making a credi-
ble promise of better behavior than another, and future electoral defeat 
is “a fairly blunt instrument” for enforcing access guarantees.43  Alter-
natively, government officials might promise to relinquish secrecy for a 
slightly different reason: to extend or retain the scope of government 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Lawrence K. Grossman, Reflections on Leaks in the United States: The Media Perspec-
tives, in FREE SPEECH AND NATIONAL SECURITY 78, 79 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1991). 
40 See, e.g., ERIK SAAR, INSIDE THE WIRE: A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOLDIER’S EYEWITNESS AC-
COUNT OF LIFE AT GUANTANAMO (2005); SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: HOW THE DE-
PARTMENT OF DEFENSE MISHANDLED THE DISASTER AT ABU GHRAIB xv–xvi, 22, 34–35, 44 (2004).  
Law has, however, plainly contributed to recent reporting.  See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Justice De-
partment Opens Inquiry into Abuse of U.S. Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A14 (drawing on 
anonymous sources and documents obtained by the ACLU under FOIA). 
41 See John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability, 
in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 131, 132–33, 137–38 (Adam Przeworski et 
al. eds., 1999). 
42 Transparency in the violation of transparency norms is a problem whether the system in-
cludes access law or not.  Political scientists and sociologists have pointed to this difficulty by 
distinguishing “deep” from “shallow” secrets.  Sometimes information outsiders are aware that 
information is being withheld from them (making the secrecy shallow); other times they are not 
(making the secrecy deep).  See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 32, at 121; KIM LANE SCHEP-
PELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 21 (1988); Dennis F. Thomp-
son, Democratic Secrecy, 114 POLI. SCI. Q. 181 (1999); infra text accompanying note 178 (discussing 
the importance of leaks); cf. Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 337, 370 (1997) (recognizing the distinction but disagreeing, from a Kantian per-
spective, with Scheppele’s Rawlsian conclusions).  In any event, deep secrecy is probably a 
more severe problem with respect to executive than legislative action.  Legislatures usually af-
fect the world through formal legislation, which is presumably public before it becomes en-
forceable (excepting, for example, the intelligence budget). 
43 Ferejohn, supra note 41, at 137. 
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power.44  “Transparency” could boost voter support for state action.  
But similar doubts are in order here, too.  Detection of secrecy and 
blunt penalties are still problems.  We also must assume that public of-
ficials prefer greater (or at least stagnant) job responsibilities.  They 
might instead prefer less turf to police45 and so never offer openness in 
the first place. 
Political pressure has certainly instigated disclosure in the past.  A 
recent example might be the 9/11 Commission’s investigation,46 which 
was initially opposed by a President whose party enjoyed (narrow) ma-
jorities in Congress.47  But these results are the product of conditions, 
not givens.  They might not be satisfied in a particular democracy at a 
particular time.  Concerns for adequate access are more serious regard-
ing executive action that is difficult for individuals to detect on their 
own; when social, professional, and legal penalties for unauthorized 
disclosure make it less likely; and where political opposition is weak 
and public skepticism minimal.  Equally problematic is a failure to pro-
vide any standard for judging whether public access is appropriate.  
Even if an official is willing to disclose information whenever it serves 
the public interest, it is a mistake to grant unrestrained individual au-
thority to make that judgment.48  Some officials will be far too cautious; 
others will offer too much disclosure for the public’s own good.  It 
makes sense, then, to add law to the system of access.  It can be con-
sciously designed to account for these circumstances. 
 Indeed, the argument for access regulation may be stronger for the 
public sector than for corporate management.  The average shareholder 
can more easily sever her connection to secretive corporate managers 
than can the average voter exit a disturbingly clandestine government.49  
Governments (especially national governments) are closer to inescap-
able monopolies than voluntarily chosen investments.  Again, there are 
                                                 
44 See id. at 133–34, 136–40; see also Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional 
Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 414–15 (2004) (elaborating on the political competition theme 
as applied to Congress). 
45 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
915 (2005) (challenging assumptions that government tends to unjustifiably expand in a sys-
tematic way). 
46 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004). 
47 See Scot J. Paltrow, Full Disclosure: White House Hurdles Delay 9/11 Commission Investiga-
tion, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2003, at A1; CBS News, Bush Opposes 9/11 Query Panel (May 23, 2002), 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/05/15/attack/main509096.shtml>. 
48 See Stiglitz, Information, supra note 37, at 26.  For further analysis of leaking as an informal 
option, see text accompanying notes 167–179. 
49 See Stiglitz, Transparency, supra note 37, at 127–28; Stiglitz, Information, supra note 37, at 26.  
A few liberals might have moved to Canada after the 2004 elections, but probably not many.  
Cf. Rick Lyman, Some Bush Foes Vote Yet Again, with Their Feet: Canada or Bust, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 
2005 (“Firm numbers on potential émigrés are elusive.”). 
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elections for both corporate and political office.  But mechanisms of 
control over government officials by voters are likely less forceful than 
those used to discipline corporate management.50 
 Finally, promoting access to information about government might 
represent an agreement to disagree about behavioral norms.  Pro-
disclosure policies can implement a compromise: expose conduct for 
evaluation by principals instead of specifying good or bad conduct in 
law ex ante.  A democratic society might facilitate citizen ability to 
judge their government on individually chosen normative principles.  
We might not be willing or able to agree on statutory language in-
tended to cap private influence on lawmakers, for example, and yet 
find adequate support for rules that mandate the disclosure of contacts 
between lobbyists and legislators.  The for-profit private sector seems 
different.  There is perhaps a narrower band of rational grounds for 
judging corporate behavior and objectives (i.e., maximizing investor 
wealth) such that the costs associated with broad access rights become 
less tolerable.51  We might reasonably conclude that a few measures of 
financial health are sufficient in the corporate context, without ordinar-
ily requiring by law disclosures that detail outsider influence on mana-
gerial decisions.  In any event, access-promoting law seems at least as 
desirable in the context of government operations. 
 None of this dictates “government transparency.”  That might be a 
fine slogan but it does not suggest a realistic platform.52  Unfettered ac-
cess to government information will cripple the state’s public-regarding 
efforts as much as anything else.  Openness exposes not just waste, 
fraud, and abuse, but also battle plans, law enforcement sources, confi-
dential and otherwise candid advice, intimately private information, 
and trade secrets.  In addition, social welfare might be enhanced if the 
government sometimes withholds its enforcement policies from the 
public, like the algorithm for selecting income tax returns for audits or 
the patterns of police patrols.53  Restricted information flow can there-
fore enhance government efficacy and prevent commercial or personal 
injury to private parties.  A rule of full disclosure might also prompt of-
ficials to sanitize the public record as it is created.  Nor will information 
                                                 
50 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Consti-
tutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 355 (2000).  With respect to the U.S. presidency, matters are 
not helped by repeated final-period problems that accompany a two-term limit. 
51 Cf. id. at 355 (“Unlike investors in private firms, then, the principals of governments do 
not share a singular interest in maximizing firm value.”). 
52 Accord Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 583 (1986) 
(“[S]ociety is distinctly ambivalent about the benefits of increased knowledge.”); Mark Fenster, 
The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. _, _ (2006 forthcoming) (manuscript at 7). 
53 See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
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fuel only public-welfare-enhancing interests.  Access can facilitate rent-
seeking at the expense of the common good, or translate destructive 
populist rages into formal law.54 
Thankfully, radical public access seems to have occurred only under 
defunct regimes and perhaps in extremely small communities where 
the public/private line disappears.  Every other living democracy must 
make choices about what to reveal and what to conceal, understanding 
that disclosure might threaten vital objectives while secrecy might 
threaten government legitimacy.  They aim for government “translu-
cency” more than “transparency.” 
 
B. Comparative Constitutional Law 
 Assuming access law is desirable, what form should it take?  How 
should it manage the contest among values of openness, injury preven-
tion, and efficacy?  One option is to use constitutional law and judicial 
review.  If access law is denominated fundamental and supreme, we 
might (not must) be more confident that it will withstand attack from 
political elites, bureaucrats, and partisan desires.  If an independent ju-
diciary is involved, we might (not must) gain advantage from the 
judgment of an institution somewhat insulated from ordinary politics.55  
These propositions go beyond public access claims.  They also can sup-
port executive secrecy. 
Several other democracies seem to accept these propositions.56  Even 
ignoring “right to receive information” provisions, which might not 
reach unwilling government sources, at least two-dozen foreign consti-
tutions now explicitly command some degree of public access to gov-
ernment-held information or records.57  These provisions are not merely 
                                                 
54 See generally Vermeule, supra note 44, at 412–13; Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press 
Fights for the Right to Know, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1962) (adding that openness may deter 
public officials from constructive confessions of ignorance).  On the tension between the need 
for public-regarding reasons and open deliberation in democracy, see Simone Chambers, Behind 
Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation, 12 J. POLI. PHIL. 389 (2004). 
55 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 88, 102–03, 112 (1980); SAGER, supra note 19, at 74. 
56 See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 
1228 (1999) (suggesting the possible value of cautiously analyzed foreign experience). 
57 Freedominfo.org puts the number of access provisions at forty, see DAVID BANISAR, THE 
FREEDOMINFO.ORG GLOBAL SURVEY: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT RE-
CORD LAWS AROUND THE WORLD 4 (2004), <http://www.freedominfo.org/survey.htm>, but that 
number seems to include provisions that do not speak to executive access or that more vaguely 
declare a right to receive information.  E.g., CONSTITUTION OF LATVIA art. 100 (1998); see also INT’L 
COVENANT ON CIV. & POLI. RTS. art. 19; EURO. CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RTS. & 
FUND’L FREEDOMS art. 10; HERDÍS THORGEIRSDÓTTIR, JOURNALISM WORTHY OF THE NAME: FREEDOM 
WITHIN THE PRESS AND THE AFFIRMATIVE SIDE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 111–17 (2005). 
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hortatory.  There is a significant body of case law in the field.  And 
while these sources cannot be restated as a uniform constitutional law 
of access, they do share a provocative point: it is appropriate to consti-
tutionally assure a measure of public access to government informa-
tion, and even a measure of secrecy.  Moreover, enforcement of access 
guarantees is a multi-institutional effort.  When foreign courts inter-
vene, they tend to rely on the work of other political actors, sometimes 
explicitly leaving room for judicial retreat.  Foreign experience there-
fore suggests that constitutional access norms are feasible and useful if 
their aspirations are limited. 
 
1. Textual provisions 
 Written access guarantees vary in strength.  A weak type is simply 
legislation-prompting.  It orders the legislature to enter the field, with-
out providing an independently enforceable public access right.  Con-
stitutions of Estonia, Greece, and the Netherlands likely fall into this 
category.58 
 Most access clauses are more ambitious, however.  A second type 
constitutionalizes a baseline of public access.  Although the location of 
the baseline may differ and legislative exemptions may be authorized, 
these provisions are self-executing.  The Czech Republic probably fits 
this model.  Its constitutional text obligates government to disclose cer-
tain information and apparently without waiting for legislation: “Or-
gans of the State and of local self-government shall provide in an 
appropriate manner information on their activity.”59  But this provision 
leaves room for subsequent legislative judgment: “The conditions and 
the form of implementation of this duty shall be set by law.”60 
                                                                                                                                
Unless otherwise noted, citations are to English translations of constitutions collected by 
the Venice Commission.  See 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE: TEXTS COLLECTED BY THE COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE VENICE COMMISSION vii (2004) (noting forty-six constitutions in the collection).  Cases 
and English-language summaries thereof are also available at the Commission’s website 
(http://codices.coe.int).  Other sources were used to extend the scope of case law reviewed. 
58 See CONSTITUTION OF ESTONIA art. 44, para. 2 (1992) (stating that authorities must provide 
certain information about their work but “to the extent and in accordance with procedures de-
termined by law”); CONSTITUTION OF GREECE art. 10.3 (1975) (“A request for information shall 
oblige the competent authority to reply, provided the law stipulates.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE 
NETHERLANDS art. 110 (1983) (“In the exercise of their duties government bodies shall observe 
the right of public access to information in accordance with rules to be prescribed by Act of Par-
liament.”). 
59 CZECH REPUBLIC, CHARTER OF FUND’L RTS. & FREEDOMS art. 17.5 (1993). 
60 Id.; accord CONSTITUTION OF ALBANIA art. 23.1–.2 (1998) (declaring that “[t]he right to in-
formation is guaranteed” but also stating that “everyone has the right, in compliance with law, to 
obtain information about the activity of state organs, and of persons who exercise state func-
tions”) (emphasis added); CONSTITUTION OF COLUMBIA art. 74 (1991) (declaring that every person 
has a right to access public documents “except in cases established by law”), reprinted in 4 CON-
STITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 163, 176 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1995); CONSTITUTION 
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Finally, many clauses impose explicit restraints on legislative discre-
tion.  They may dictate a degree of secrecy, a degree of openness, or 
both.  Take Romania.  Its access provision begins with a qualified decla-
ration of openness—“A person’s right of access to any information of 
public interest cannot be restricted”61—while another clause makes clear 
that this right “shall not be prejudicial to the protection of the young or 
to national security.”62  In Austria, administrative officials “shall impart 
information about matters pertaining to their sphere of competence,” 
but only “insofar as this does not conflict with a legal obligation to 
                                                                                                                                
OF BELGIUM art. 32 (1994); CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES art. III, § 7 (1987), reprinted in 15 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 163, 170 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz 
eds., 1986); CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC art. 25.5 (1992, as amended in 2001); CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA art. 39, para. 2 (1991); see also Legaspi v. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n, 150 S. Ct. Rpts. Ann. 530, 534–35, 541–42 (May 29, 1987) (en banc) [Philippines] (declar-
ing that its constitutional provision is self-executing, and ordering disclosure of information to 
check civil service eligibility of city health department employees). 
Other wrinkles are possible.  South Africa’s 1996 Constitution straddles the line between 
legislation-prompting and access baselines.  It provides that everyone has a right of access to 
information held by the state, see CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA § 32(1)(a) 
(1996), and that national legislation “must be enacted to give effect to this right,” id. § 32(2).  A 
transitional provision indicated that, in the absence of such legislation, access rights are limited 
to “information . . . required for the exercise or protection of” other rights.  Id. schedule 6, art. 
23(2).  And a third clause seems to deprive the legislature of authority to enact access legislation 
if it delays for three years.  See id. art. 23(3).  South Africa thus encouraged legislation without 
requiring it, with inaction resulting in a modest but self-executing access provision.  See gener-
ally Jonathan Klaaren, Access to Information and National Security in South Africa, in NATIONAL SE-
CURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE, 193, 203, 207 (2003) [hereinafter 
BALANCE] (critiquing implementation of this guarantee with regard to national security infor-
mation). 
61 CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA art. 31.1 (1991) (emphasis added); see also CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA art. 41.2 (1991) (referring to “information . . . on any matter of legitimate 
interest to” the requesting citizen) (emphasis added); cf. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
CROATIA art. 38, cl. 1 (2001) (“Journalists shall have the right to . . . access to information.”) (em-
phasis added). 
62 CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA art. 31.3 (1991); see also CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BUL-
GARIA art. 41.1 (1991) (granting a general right to obtain information but declaring that it shall 
not be exercised to the detriment of the rights of others, national security, public order, or pub-
lic health and morality); id. art. 41.2 (granting rights to obtain information “which is not a state 
or official secret and does not affect the rights of others”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
CROATIA art. 37 (2001) (“Everyone shall be guaranteed the safety and secrecy of personal data.  . 
. .  Protection of data and supervision of the work of information systems in the State shall be 
regulated by law.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA art. 34.3 (1994) (“The right of 
access to information may not prejudice either the measures taken to protect citizens or national 
security.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND § 58 (1997) (“A person shall have the 
right to get access to public information in possession of a Government agency, State agency, 
State enterprise or local administration, unless the disclosure of such information shall affect 
the security of the State, public safety or interests of other persons which shall be protected as 
provided by law.”), reprinted in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1, 13 (Gisbert 
H. Flanz ed., 1998). 
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maintain secrecy.”63  Another provision adverts to secrecy obligations.  
These officials are: 
[S]ave as otherwise provided by law, pledged to secrecy about 
all facts of which they have obtained knowledge exclusively 
from their official activity and whose concealment is enjoined 
on them [1] in the interest of the maintenance of public peace, 
order and security, [2] of universal national defence, of external 
relations, [3] in the interest of a public law corporate body, [4] 
for the preparation of a ruling or [5] in the preponderant inter-
est of the parties involved . . . .64 
 Other constitutions enhance public access by restricting legislative 
discretion.  Finland’s constitution states that documents and recordings 
possessed by government authorities are public “unless their publica-
tion has for compelling reasons been specifically restricted by an Act.”65  
A legislative exemption from public access must therefore satisfy a 
clear statement rule and be supported by a persuasive justification.  Al-
ternatively, some constitutions speak directly to the standards for ac-
cess.  In Poland, the list of acceptable justifications for secrecy is 
extensive and perhaps flexible, but closed: limitations on rights to ob-
tain information “may be imposed by statute solely to protect freedoms 
and rights of other persons and economic subjects, public order, secu-
rity or important economic interests of the State.”66 
 Sweden’s Freedom of the Press Act has the oldest heritage, the most 
detail, and arguably the strongest restraints on legislative discretion.67  
It combines elements from each of the constitutions just discussed: ex-
emptions from access require a clear legislative statement, necessity, 
and accordance with one of seven categories.  Thus the first of several 
                                                 
63 CONSTITUTION OF AUSTRIA art. 20(4) (1987). 
64 Id. art. 20(3). 
65 CONSTITUTION OF FINLAND § 12 (2000), reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF 
THE WORLD 1, 3 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2000); cf. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY art. 
61.1, .3 (1989) (“[E]veryone has the right . . . to receive and impart information of public interest.  
. . . .  A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament present is required to 
pass the statute on the public access to information of public interest . . . .”); CONSTITUTION OF 
PERU art. 2(5) (1993) (“Information involving intimate personal matters and that expressly ex-
cluded by law or for reasons of national security is excluded . . . .”) (emphasis added), reprinted 
in 14 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 109 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1995). 
66 CONSTITUTION OF POLAND art. 61.3 (1997) (emphasis added); cf. CONSTITUTION OF SPAIN art. 
105 (1978) (requiring the law to regulate citizen access to administrative records and files “ex-
cept as they may concern the security and defense of the State, the investigation of crimes and 
the privacy of individuals”); CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC art. 268.2 (1989) (simi-
lar). 
67 For another old, but narrower, provision, see France’s DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF 
MAN art. 14 (1789) (“All the citizens have a right to decide, either personally or by their repre-
sentatives, as to the necessity of the public contribution; to grant this freely; to know to what 
uses it is put.”). 
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detailed articles declares that “[e]very Swedish citizen shall be entitled 
to have free access to official documents, in order to encourage the free 
exchange of opinion and the availability of comprehensive informa-
tion.”68  Article 2 then explains that this access right “may be restricted 
only if restriction is necessary having regard to” seven categories of pos-
sible exemptions.69  Those categories include national security and in-
ternational relations, crime control, privacy, and even “the preservation 
of animal or plant species.”70  As for the clear-statement rule, article 2 
adds that “[a]ny restriction of the right of access to official documents 
shall be scrupulously specified in a provision of a special act of law, or . . . 
in another act of law to which the special act refers.”71  Although Swe-
den does not have a tradition of robust judicial review, its access provi-
sion is nevertheless meaningful.72 
 
2. Judicial intervention 
 Like the character of access provisions, judicial intervention into the 
access field differs across countries.  If there is one theme in the deci-
sions, it is that courts are reluctant to independently, authoritatively, 
and conclusively dictate access norms.  They tend to proceed cautiously 
whether or not constitutional text speaks to the issue.  Bulgaria presents 
a rather extreme illustration of judicial retreat.  Its access provision 
looks self-executing: “Citizens shall be entitled to obtain information 
from state bodies and agencies on any matter of legitimate interest to 
them which is not a state or official secret and does not affect the rights 
of others.”73  Yet that country’s constitutional court was unwilling to 
move without more specific legislative authorization: “The concrete 
contents” of the obligation to provide information “cannot be deter-
mined in any other manner but through legislation.”74  Not every court 
                                                 
68 THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS ACT [Sweden], ch. 2, art. 1 (adopted in 1766 & 1949, amended 
in 1976). 
69 See id. art. 2 (emphasis added). 
70 See id. 
71 See id. (emphasis added). 
72 See Bernard Michael Ortwein II, The Swedish Legal System: An Introduction, 13 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 405, 408 n. 17, 414–15 (2003). 
73 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA art. 41.2 (1991). 
74 ALEXSANDER KASHAMOV, ACCESS TO INFORMATION LITIGATION IN BULGARIA 11 n.8 (2002), 
<http://www.aip-bg.org/pdf/court_eng.pdf> (quoting Constitutional Court of Bulgaria, Case 
No. 7/96, Ruling No. 7 of 4.VI.1996 (Dec. 6, 1996)); see also Károly Bárd, Judicial Independence in 
the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, in JUDICIAL INTEGRITY 265, 284 
(András Sajó ed., 2004) (suggesting lack of public confidence in Bulgaria’s judicial system); 
Alexander Kashumov, National Security and the Right to Information in Bulgaria, in BALANCE, su-
pra note 60, at 123, 126–27, 136; Constitutional Court of Bulgaria, Case No. 11/2002, Decision 
No. 3 (Sept. 25, 2002) (as summarized in 
http://www.constcourt.bg/constcourt/ks_eng_frame.htm) (dividing and therefore upholding 
repeal of legislation providing access to defunct secret police files). 
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is so shy, however.  Indeed, foreign judiciaries have employed several 
techniques to invigorate public access norms without assuming sole or 
even primary responsibility for the system. 
a. Nondelegation and clarification.  Foreign courts have repudiated 
access regulation schemes for their lack of potency.  Lithuania went 
through the experience.  That country’s 1996 ruling was important yet 
mild.  The constitutional court conceded that the Lithuanian constitu-
tion’s guarantee of public access did not reach certain state secrets.75  
But the court nevertheless concluded that the legislature failed ade-
quately to constrain the categories of information that could be with-
held by the executive.76  The decision therefore shifted more of the 
responsibility for generating public access norms from administrators 
to legislators, without necessarily enlisting the judiciary in that task.77 
b. Declaration of principle and legislative reconsideration.  The Hungar-
ian Constitutional Court reached similar results on more assertive ra-
tionales.  It struck down parts of a lustration law in 1994.  This statute 
mandated background checks for certain officials but gave them the 
choice of resigning to prevent public disclosure.  In essence, the court 
required the legislature to rebalance access and privacy rights, along 
with the interest in “informational self-determination” of those who 
were spied on.78  The decision relied on structural logic.  “Democrati-
cally formed public opinion is an indispensable, institutional aspect of a 
constitutional state, and it is thus the constitutional obligation of the 
                                                 
75 See CONSTITUTION OF LITHUANIA art. 25, para. 5 (1992) (granting citizens the right to 
“available information which concerns them” in the manner established by law.”). 
76 See Constitutional Court of Lithuania, Case 3/96, §§ 1.2, 1.4 (Dec. 19, 1996), 
<http://www.lrkt.lt/dokumentai/1996/n6a1219a.htm>; see generally Nida Gelazis, Defending Or-
der and Freedom: The Lithuanian Constitutional Court in Its First Decade, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUS-
TICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST 
EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 395 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002). 
77 See also Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, Case No. Pl. US 11/2000 (July 12, 
2001) (as summarized in http://codices.coe.int, indexed as CZE-2001-2-012) (striking down por-
tions of the Protection of Classified Information Act involving administrative discretion and 
denial of security clearances absent independent judicial review); cf. Military Secret Leakage 
Case, 4 KCCR 64, 89 Hun-Ka104 (Feb. 25, 1992) [South Korea] (as described in CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: 1988–
1998, at 143, 144 (2001) [hereinafter TEN YEARS] (narrowing a criminal statute prohibiting leaks 
of “military secrets” to only undisclosed facts, marked classified, the disclosure of which will 
pose a clear threat to national security); Jibong Lim, Korean Constitutional Court Standing at the 
Crossroads: Focusing on Real Cases and Variational Types of Decisions, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 327, 328–29, 336–43, 357–59 (2002) (noting tools of restraint to help the court survive). 
78 See Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision No. 60/1994 (XII.22) AB (points 1 & 5), re-
printed in 2 E. EURO. CASE RPTR. OF CONST. L. 159, 162–63, 169–72, 175–76, 190–91 (Dec. 22, 1994); 
see also Gabor Halmai, Laszlo Majtenyi & Kim Lane Scheppele, Confronting the Past: The Hungar-
ian Constitutional Court’s Lustration Decision of 1994, 1 E. EURO. HUMAN RTS. REV. 111, 118–19 
(1996) (describing cases on access to local government meetings and socialist archives). 
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State to provide the conditions for its development and maintenance.”79  
At the same time: 
The political decision about the precise determination of the 
range of information subject to the probe and the range of in-
formation to be deemed personal cannot be based upon the 
Constitution, but instead on the constitutional certainty that the 
records neither can be kept secret, nor be brought entirely to 
light.80 
In other words, the court was willing to unsettle a political compromise 
by invoking constitutional access mandates—yet it refused to write up 
the details of a new compromise as a matter of constitutional law.  
Hungary’s constitution was invoked to restart the political process, but 
no one indicated that the document itself was a sufficient source from 
which the judiciary alone could engineer a comprehensive public access 
policy. 
 In fact, access clauses in constitutional text have not been essential 
to judicial action.  The Israeli Supreme Court acted without an express 
charge in positive law.  In 1990, it recognized the principle that coali-
tion agreements, which are practically essential to forming a govern-
ment in Israel, must ordinarily be disclosed to the public.  The Court 
relied on a structural feature of representative democracy: 
Freedom of public opinion and knowledge of what is happen-
ing in the channels of government are an integral part of a de-
mocratic regime, which is structured on the constant sharing of 
information about what is happening in public life with the 
public itself.  Withholding of information is justifiable only in 
exceptional cases where security of the State or foreign rela-
tions may be impaired or where there is a risk of harming some 
vital public interest.81 
Yet Israel’s decision was like Hungary’s in preferring legislative in-
volvement.  The court authorized the Knesset to help regulate the field, 
establishing the principle of disclosure but leaving its details to the leg-
islature.82 
                                                 
79 Decision No. 60/1994, supra note 78, at 173; see id. at 169 (“[T]he fundamental right to the 
freedom of information presumes that the functioning of the State is transparent to its citi-
zens.”). 
80 Id. at 176 (emphasis in original); cf. id. at 177–78 (proceeding to critique the categories of 
persons subject to background checks).  On this court’s procedure and power more generally, 
see Georg Brunner, Structure and Proceedings of the Hungarian Constitutional Judiciary, in CONSTI-
TUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY: THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 65, 70, 76–
89, 93 (László Sólyom & Georg Brunner eds., 2000). 
81 Shalit v. Peres, 44(3) P.D. 353, H.C. 1601-4/90, at 214 [1990]; see id. at 218–20 (Barak, J.). 
82 See id. at 217. 
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 c. Borrowing rules.  Another important example of judicial interven-
tion occurred recently in India.  Official investigations indicated signifi-
cant connections between politicians and criminal gangs.  India’s 
Supreme Court considered the evidence of corruption, along with pro-
posals by the nation’s election commission that would have required 
legislative candidates to disclose information regarding criminal pro-
ceedings against them and their personal finances.  The court then or-
dered the commission to mandate a list of disclosures, with recalcitrant 
candidates facing removal from the ballot.83  The court was, however, 
unwilling to assume sole responsibility for designing a system of can-
didate disclosure: “where there is inaction by the executive, for what-
ever reason, the judiciary must step in, in exercise of its constitutional 
obligations to provide a solution”—but just until the legislature enacts 
“proper legislation to cover the field.”84  It forced action while drawing 
on the proposals of others and leaving room for supplanting legislation.  
India may have a weak record of protecting controversial private 
speech,85 but its courts found a way to encourage a measure of official 
openness. 
* * * 
 National constitutions are written and implemented in unique cir-
cumstances, and so caution is in order before foreign ideas are im-
ported into domestic law.  Some of the countries discussed here were 
recovering from more authoritarian forms of government when their 
current constitutions were adopted.  Some faced problems unknown to 
the United States today, such as the absence of mass media organiza-
tions with meaningful independence from the central government.  
Their written constitutions sometimes reflect those challenges without 
                                                 
83 See Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, Civ. App. No. 7178, 2 LRI 305, 
paras. 34, 38, 46, 53 (2002) (available in LexisNexis database) (relying on free speech and de-
mocracy to derive a people’s/voters’ right to get information about public functionaries). 
84 Id. para. 51.  Another Indian decision reached judicial and executive information.  The 
court ordered disclosure of correspondence between the Law Minister and the Chief Justice 
pertaining to certain judicial appointments.  See S.P. Gupta v. President of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 
149, 158–59 (deriving information access claims from textually guaranteed speech rights); see 
also Constitutional Court of Latvia, Case No. 04-02(99) (July 6, 1999), <http://codices.coe.int/cgi-
bin/om_isapi.dll?clientID=1765517&infobase=codices.nfo&softpage=Doc_ Frame_Pg42> (relying 
in part on access legislation and international law to invalidate executive action that permitted 
government contractors to keep their contracts confidential); Forests Survey Inspection Request 
Case, 1 KCCR 176, 88Hun-Ma22 (Sept. 4, 1989) [South Korea], 
<http://www.ccourt.go.kr/english/decision03.htm#c3-2-1> (as described in TEN YEARS, supra 
note 77) (deriving self-executing access claims from rights of speech, similar to the Indian Su-
preme Court cases, and holding that a county violated the constitution by ignoring requests for 
forest- and property-survey records). 
85 See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, DEMOCRACY IN THE BALANCE: VIOLENCE, HOPE, AND INDIA’S FU-
TURE ch. 7 (forthcoming 2006) (discussing efforts to restrain academic publication by court or-
der). 
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providing obvious lessons for our own system of public access and 
state secrecy.  It also seems clear that a formally entrenched and judi-
cially enforceable law of public access is not absolutely necessary to a 
legitimate democracy.  Great Britain is perhaps the leading example on 
this point.  Similarly, penciling in public access guarantees does not en-
sure meaningful government accountability.  Uzbekistan’s constitution 
has a written access guarantee but that hardly makes the country a 
model democracy.86 
 At the same time, a few salient points can be distilled from foreign 
experience.  First, information access is commonly seen as a component 
of a well-functioning democracy.  Whether by textual direction or judi-
cial inference, whether from outright structural logic or pinned on free 
speech principles, numerous countries understand the importance of 
public information about government operations.  Surely this under-
standing applies equally well in the United States.  Second, while pub-
lic access is now often included in constitutional text, so too is support 
for access restrictions.  Secrecy, not just openness, is becoming a con-
sensus value.  In a strong sense, secrecy and openness are locations on a 
single dimension.  Both suggest a ratio of information insiders to in-
formation outsiders.  Indeed information access may entail unhappy 
trade-offs, which a nation’s fundamental law might profitably identify.  
Accordingly constitutional law in non-U.S. democracies often reaches 
the information flow from government to public in more than one 
way—sometimes dictating access, sometimes requiring secrecy, some-
times backed by court intervention, always involving institutions other 
than the judiciary. 
 This last observation about institutional collaboration the third les-
son from foreign experience, and it is worth emphasizing.  When press-
ing for reform, foreign courts have been gentle.  They avoid the strain 
of wholesale system design in favor of more limited tools: demanding 
clarity in nonconstitutional rules; declaring general principles on which 
action must follow; identifying substantial system deficiencies without 
mandating exclusive solutions; and borrowing proposals fashioned 
elsewhere to provide at least interim relief.  All of this helps mark the 
outline of a balanced and multi-institutional approach to information 
access problems. 
                                                 
86 See CONSTITUTION OF UZBEKISTAN art. 30 (1992); BANISAR, supra note 57, at 95–96 (noting 
access restrictions); Adrian Karatnycky, The 2003 Freedom House Survey: National Income and Lib-
erty, 15 J. DEM. 82, 91 (2004) (rating Uzbekistan at or near the bottom of a seven-point scale for 
political rights and civil liberties); see also K.S. Venkateswaran, India: National Security, Freedom 
of Expression and Emergency Powers, in SECRECY AND LIBERTY: NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 321, 329–31 (Sandra Coliver et al. eds., 1999) (asserting 
a culture of secrecy in India’s bureaucracy). 
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II. OUR UNEASY ORDER 
 In some ways the text of the United States Constitution is obviously 
different from the foreign law just canvassed.  As discussed in more de-
tail below,87 the document lacks a general-purpose public access provi-
sion, a special procedure for enacting laws affecting public access, or an 
explicit obligation to pass such legislation.88  It also lacks a clause gov-
erning secrecy in the executive branch.  Yet the United States shares a 
democratic structure with the countries discussed above.  Informed 
public discussion about government operations is no less important.  In 
addition, our federal courts have become as active and effective as any.  
Absence of explicit constitutional authorization for judicial intervention 
has not been a complete bar to U.S. court action in other areas.  Finding 
it for access issues would not be surprising. 
 
A. Partial Constitutionalizing 
 As it turns out, United States courts have been reluctant to dictate 
access to information about the federal executive branch as a matter of 
constitutional law.  But as foreign law suggests, openness is not the 
only relevant norm.  Secrecy might be part of constitutional law, too.  In 
fact, our courts recognize some constitutional protection for executive 
discretion to withhold information.  Adding this component to the 
formal system for evaluating public access claims alters the mix of in-
                                                 
87 See infra Part II.B. 
88 Contrast the following state constitutional provisions regarding executive-held informa-
tion: CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3(b) (adopted in 2004 by initiative) (establishing a public access right 
“to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business,” an interpretive rule favoring 
access that applies to existing and new laws, and a requirement that new limitations be accom-
panied by findings of need, but shielding privacy protections and otherwise grandfathering in 
current law); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a)–(c) (establishing a right to inspect “any public record” 
and opening certain executive branch meetings, while permitting exemptions only after a two-
thirds vote in both houses and only if such legislation “state[s] with specificity the public neces-
sity justifying the exemption” and is “no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated pur-
pose of the law”); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 3 (“No person shall be denied the right to observe the 
deliberations of public bodies and examine public documents, except in cases established by 
law.”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived of the right to examine docu-
ments or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and 
its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the 
merits of public disclosure.”); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 8 (“All power residing originally in, and 
being derived from, the people, all the magistrates and officers of government are their substi-
tutes and agents, and at all times accountable to them.  Government, therefore, should be open, 
accessible, accountable and responsive.  To that end, the public’s right of access to governmen-
tal proceedings and records shall not be unreasonably restricted.”); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6 
(“Unless otherwise provided by law, all records of public or governmental bodies, boards, bu-
reaus, commissions, or agencies of the state or any political subdivision of the state, or organi-
zations or agencies supported in whole or in part by public funds or expending public funds, 
shall be public.”). 
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formation it can produce, and allows a kind of reasoning that is difficult 
to contain. 
 
1. Spheres of executive discretion 
 Our courts protect government secrets with constitutional law, and 
for good reason.  Effective executive power and the President’s success 
as commander in chief sometime depend on discretion to withhold in-
formation from general circulation.  Deliberation, diplomacy, and mili-
tary victory can be jeopardized when the executive cannot control 
information.89  Federal constitutional law meets these concerns in two 
ways.  First, the President has inherent authority to restrict access to 
sensitive information, as when disclosure would threaten legitimate na-
tional security interests.  Congressional authorization is unnecessary 
before the President takes action to limit access to such data.90  Second, 
courts are willing to insulate certain executive decisions to maintain se-
crecy despite the contrary wishes of other institutions.  An executive 
decision in this field is sometimes final and supreme. 
 a. Executive privilege.  The first decision worth considering ended 
badly for the President but not the presidency.  In United States v. 
Nixon,91 the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the President’s mo-
tion to quash a subpoena duces tecum and rejected his argument for an 
absolute executive privilege.  That prerogative would have afforded 
presidents judicially unreviewable discretion to withhold their confi-
dential communications with advisors.92  The Court also held that the 
Special Prosecutor had adequately demonstrated sufficient need for in 
camera inspection of the recordings and documents in question, in 
view of the President’s reliance on a “generalized interest in confidenti-
ality.”93 
Yet the Nixon case did an important favor for presidential power.  It 
validated a qualified executive privilege to withhold information, and it 
planted that privilege in constitutional law.94  This conclusion was eas-
                                                 
89 See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–21 (1936) 
(recognizing virtues of executive secrecy in foreign affairs). 
90 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). 
91 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
92 See id. at 703–07. 
93 Id. at 713; see id. at 710 (noting that the President did not argue that military or diplomatic 
secrets would be disclosed); see also id. at 707. 
94 See id. at 705–06, 708, 711–13.  For some critical commentary, see RAOUL BERGER, EXECU-
TIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974).  For a defense of executive privilege in some 
form, see MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC AC-
COUNTABILITY ch. 6 (1994). 
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ily avoidable by arguendo assumptions.95  The Court was making a spe-
cial effort to add constitutional protection for the executive.  Further-
more, the Court openly conceded that constitutional text was 
inadequate to establish executive privilege for confidential communica-
tions.96  And the opinion hardly mentioned historical materials.97  The 
logic for a presumptive constitutional privilege was practical and struc-
tural: the efficacy of the presidency can be undermined by the speech-
dampening effect of unrestricted access to presidential communications 
with staff.98  “Nowhere in the Constitution . . . is there any explicit ref-
erence to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest re-
lates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is 
constitutionally based.”99 
 Just how far executive privilege should extend is contested.  Aside 
from the uncertainty generated by qualified tests of any kind, there is 
controversy over the constitutionally required scope of the privilege.  
Several access restrictions can be broken out from that general heading.  
They include protection for presidential communications (at least be-
tween the President and his closest advisors), deliberative process not 
involving the President himself, state or military secrets, and confiden-
tial sources.100  Likewise unsettled is whether the scope of executive 
privilege should change when Congress demands information.  In any 
event, federal courts are willing to afford the executive qualified consti-
tutional protection from information demands. 
                                                 
95 Cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 698 (discussing FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c) limits and citing the constitu-
tional avoidance canon in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring)). 
96 See id. at 711; see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998) (stating 
that Nixon dealt with a privilege unknown to the common law); David A. Strauss, Common Law, 
Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1741–44 (2003) (arguing that Nixon 
is an example of constitutional text fading when the issue becomes more important). 
97 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 n. 15 (noting that the Constitutional Convention was closed). 
98 See id. at 705–06 & n. 16 (indicating that a privilege for presidential communications 
“flow[s]” from enumerated powers, per McCulloch v. Maryland); id. at 708 (underscoring the 
value of candor).  Whether presidential control over the privilege is a net good has been de-
bated.  See 26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5673, at 39 (1992).  For an empirical study of evidentiary 
privileges, see Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney Client Privilege: A Study of the Par-
ticipants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191 (1989). 
99 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711. 
100 See generally 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4–15, at 770–71 (3d 
ed. 2000); 26 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 98, § 5664; see also Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 
53, 62 (1957) (recognizing a qualified privilege for police informants but rejecting its use on the 
facts); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (indicating limits on in camera court re-
view in state secrets cases); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 
1113–14 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (distinguishing deliberative-process from presidential-communications 
privilege). 
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 b. FACA and presidential advisors.  Judicial perception of institu-
tional needs supports secrecy beyond claims of executive privilege.  It 
also affects statutory construction, especially when presidential advi-
sors or classified information would be exposed.  As to the former, 
courts have ensured minimum interference from the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA).  That statute covers certain private groups “es-
tablished or utilized” by the President or a federal agency to get ad-
vice.101  These groups are supposed to be regulated in several ways.  
FACA requires that they hold open meetings unless the executive de-
termines that closure comports with the Government in the Sunshine 
Act; it mandates notice of meetings and meeting minutes; and it sub-
jects the group’s records to FOIA.102 
In Public Citizen v. Department of Justice,103 the question was whether 
the ABA’s federal judiciary committee was “utilized” by the executive 
within the meaning of FACA.  Using the word’s common meaning, it 
was hard to say no.  For decades the Justice Department had asked for 
and received the ABA’s investigation-backed advice regarding poten-
tial nominees.  Essentially conceding the textual point, the majority in-
stead condemned the lay reading using other sources (including the 
executive’s pre-FACA practice under its own executive order104), and 
ultimately relied on a canon of constitutional avoidance to “tip the bal-
ance decisively.”105  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence went further, resting 
solely on constitutional ground: “The mere fact that FACA would regu-
late so as to interfere with the manner in which the President obtains 
information necessary to discharge his duty assigned under the Consti-
tution to nominate federal judges is enough to invalidate the Act [as 
applied here].”106 
 Public Citizen might be unimportant standing alone.  Constitutional 
concern centered on the textually explicit presidential nomination 
power—and the case touched on a process that the Justices themselves 
had survived.107  But sympathy for advisory confidences runs deeper 
                                                 
101 See 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(2)(A)–(B); see also id. § 4(b)–(c); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton, 76 
F.3d 1232, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
102 See 5 U.S.C. App. § 10(a)–(c); see generally 2 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DIS-
CLOSURE ch. 24 (3d ed. 2000).  For an argument that Congress cannot constitutionally regulate 
presidential advisory committees that do not receive federal appropriations, see Jay S. Bybee, 
Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51 
(1994).  FACA’s application to agency as opposed to presidential advisors is a separate matter. 
103 491 U.S. 440 (1989). 
104 See id. at 456–57 (discussing President Kennedy’s Executive Order No. 11,007). 
105 Id. at 465; see id. at 455, 460, 466. 
106 Id. at 488–89 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, J.). 
107 Records involving the appointment process for the Supreme Court were not plainly at 
issue.  See id. at 443, 444 n.1, 447. 
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and includes simple policy advice.  Cheney v. District Court108 helps 
make the argument.  Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club sought infor-
mation about an energy policy task force.  In that case, the task force 
was authorized by the President to develop a national energy policy, 
chaired by the Vice President, and populated by federal government 
employees.  But plaintiffs alleged that lobbyists participated as if they 
were full-fledged members of the group, and thus their closed meetings 
had violated FACA.109  Plaintiffs needed evidence of private influence, 
however; so the issue was whether discovery into “de facto member-
ship” would violate the Constitution.  The district court permitted dis-
covery without narrowing upfront the plaintiffs’ broad requests, while 
allowing the executive to raise particularized privilege objections.110  
Mandamus was denied in the D.C. Circuit, which relied on the district 
court to restrain the plaintiffs.111 
 The Supreme Court stepped in and chastised the appellate court for 
underestimating its authority to act swiftly.112  Availability of specific 
privilege objections was no bar to immediate consideration of a broader 
effort to immunize presidential advisors from exposure.  “As this case 
implicates the separation of powers, the Court of Appeals must . . . ask . 
. . whether the District Court’s actions constituted an unwarranted im-
pairment of another branch in the performance of its constitutional du-
ties.”113  The Supreme Court must have seen some merit in the 
constitutional objection, at least when raised by the Vice President 
against a relatively unrestrained discovery request in civil litigation.114  
A small question is why the majority was unwilling to compel issuance 
of mandamus outright, rather than remanding.  After all, the Court be-
lieved that “[t]he Executive Branch, at its highest level, [was] seeking 
                                                 
108 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004). 
109 See id. at 2583.  The General Accounting Office was tasked by certain members of Con-
gress with investigating the group, but it did not receive all of the information it sought.  See 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENERGY TASK FORCE: PROCESS USED TO DEVELOP THE NATIONAL EN-
ERGY POLICY (Aug. 2003) (GAO-03-894). 
110 See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54–55 
(D.D.C. 2002). 
111 See In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (recognizing that plaintiffs only 
needed documents on non-federal-official participants). 
112 See Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2584–85, 2593. 
113 Id. at 2592.  In dissent, Justices Ginsburg and Souter argued that defendants failed to ask 
for narrower discovery, so a remand to consider mere limits on discovery was improper.  See id. 
at 2595–99.  The Court’s vision of remand seems broader, however.  See id. at 2593 (suggesting 
reexamination of the de facto member doctrine). 
114 See id. at 2589–92 (stressing such points to distinguish Nixon); see also id. at 2589 (indicat-
ing that impairing private FACA suits would not impair “Article III authority or Congress’ cen-
tral Article I powers”); id. at 2583–84, 2592–93 (noting that the district court itself had been 
asked by plaintiffs to wield mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 to enforce FACA, which lacks an 
obvious private right of action). 
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the aid of the courts to protect its constitutional prerogatives.”115  But 
the executive did not have to wait long for victory.  Now reading the 
statute narrowly in light of “severe separation-of-powers problems,” on 
remand the en banc D.C. Circuit issued mandamus directing dismissal 
of the complaint.116 
 c. FOIA and national security.  National security information like-
wise triggers judicial modesty.  Consider cases under Exemption 1 of 
FOIA,117 which permits the executive to withhold classified documents 
from the public.  The statutory text is startling.  The records withheld 
must be not just marked classified, but in fact properly classified pursu-
ant to Executive Order;118 the executive bears the burden of proving that 
they are; and the judiciary must perform de novo review, with authority 
to examine documents in camera.119  Bear in mind what it means for in-
formation to be “in fact properly classified.”  Under the current order, 
information should be marked “confidential” (the lowest classification 
level) if its unauthorized disclosure “reasonably could be expected to 
cause damage to the national security that the original classification au-
thority is able to identify or describe.”120  This is the predictive judg-
ment that purportedly must be made, de novo, by federal courts.  And 
nearly anyone may request documents under FOIA.121 
FOIA’s aggressive message was no scrivener’s error.  Before the 
statute was so clear, the Supreme Court had scoffed at the idea of 
courts parsing and second-guessing classification decisions.  EPA v. 
Mink122 called it “wholly untenable.”123  There the Court turned aside an 
attempt by Representative Patsy Mink and other House members to ob-
tain information about a possible nuclear weapons test.  The print press 
had reported disagreement about the test among administration offi-
cials; plaintiffs wanted that debate more fully disclosed.  But the execu-
                                                 
115 Id. at 2589; see id. at 2593 (noting the appellate court truncated its analysis by misapply-
ing Nixon, and that no original writ had been requested from the Supreme Court). 
116 In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
117 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). 
118 See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 (Mar. 25, 2003).  The order forbids classifi-
cation to, for instance, “conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error.”  Id. § 
1.7(a)(1).  Note that records may be withheld even if they are classified upon a FOIA request.  
See O’REILLY, supra note 101, § 11.31. 
119 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (“[FOIA] does not apply to matters that are . . . (A) specifically 
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of 
national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Execu-
tive order”); id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (mandating de novo review, authorizing in camera inspection, 
and placing the burden of justification on the agency). 
120 Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.2(a)(3). 
121 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (referring to “any person”); id. § 552(a)(3)(E) (prohibiting in-
telligence agencies from disclosing records to foreign governments and their representatives). 
122 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (denying court authority to conduct in camera document review). 
123 Id. at 84. 
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tive offered an affidavit listing relevant documents and attesting that 
most had been duly classified.124  Even though FOIA commanded de 
novo review, the case was closed on those documents.  Justice Stewart 
wrote separately to place responsibility on Congress for writing a weak 
statute.  As he read FOIA, Congress “chose . . . to decree blind accep-
tance of Executive fiat,” despite the risk that ignorance would 
“paraly[ze]” the democratic process in this dispute.125 
Such “blind acceptance” was incompatible with the politics of the 
late-Nixon period.  A year after Mink and over the new President’s 
veto, Congress responded.126  The 1974 FOIA amendments seemed to 
enact the scheme thought unimaginable by the Court.  The new statute 
left the general de novo review provision in place, then added author-
ity for in camera review, a duty to segregate nonexempt portions of re-
cords, and the “in fact properly classified” clause.127  Congress was 
enlisting the judiciary’s help in checking executive control over classi-
fied information. 
Yet little has changed.128  The Supreme Court left Exemption 1 cases 
to the lower courts about twenty-five years ago,129 and they have been 
friendly to the executive ever since, relying in part on a passage from 
legislative history.130  Ordinarily the executive’s judgment will be de-
                                                 
124 See id. at 76–77 & n.3, 81, 84.  At that time, Exemption 1 referred to matters “specifically 
required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign 
policy.”  Id. at 81.  The executive also invoked Exemption 5, which protects certain nondiscov-
erable memoranda.  See id. at 85–94. 
125 Id. at 95 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id. at 94 (noting no constitutional question was 
at issue).  Then-Justice Rehnquist did not participate.  Three Justices dissented. 
126 See 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1318 (Oct. 17, 1974); 2 O’REILLY, supra note 101, at 510–
11, 513–15 (suggesting the political atmosphere of Watergate made Congress hostile to “na-
tional security” justifications for secrecy and confident in the judiciary). 
127 See Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1(b)(2), 2(a), (c) (Nov. 21, 1974) (amending 5 U.S.C. §§ 
552(a)(4)(B), (b)(1), and adding a sentence regarding segregable portions of documents to § 
552(b)). 
128 See generally Cheh, supra note 9, at 730; Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo 
Review in Litigation over National Security Information under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. 
L. REV. 67, 82–86 (1992); Wells, supra note 37, at 1205–08. 
129 See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139, 145 (1981) (holding that the 
military did not have to prepare and release an environmental impact assessment that would 
be covered by Exemption 1); cf. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) (extending Exemption 3 to in-
telligence sources who were not promised confidentiality, thereby relieving the CIA from satis-
fying the requirements of Exemption 1). 
130 “[T]he conferees recognize that the Executive departments responsible for national de-
fense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse effects might occur as 
a result of public disclosure of a particular classified record.  Accordingly, the conferees expect 
that Federal courts, in making de novo determinations in [Exemption 1] cases under [FOIA], will 
accord substantial weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning the details of the classified status 
of the disputed record.”  CONF. REP. NO. 93-1200, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6290.  1996 
amendments did add an oblique reference to courts giving “substantial weight” to agency deci-
sions, although without specifying classification decisions.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (as 
amended by Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 6) (“In addition to any other matters to which a court ac-
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ferred to and trusted, and procedures involving executive affidavits 
and document indexes are used to avoid actual document review.131  
Essentially the government must articulate a logical basis for classifica-
tion.  When logic is lacking in the executive’s arguments, the normal re-
sponse is to give the government another try.132  In fact, it is unclear 
whether a court has ever successfully commanded the production of 
documents withheld under Exemption 1.133  The suggestions for modi-
fying the legislation in President Ford’s veto message are, ironically, a 
good summation of post-1974 practice: 
[W]here classified documents are requested the courts could 
review the classification, but would have to uphold the classifi-
cation if there is a reasonable basis to support it.  In determin-
ing the reasonableness of the classification, the courts would 
consider all attendant evidence prior to resorting to an in cam-
era examination of the document.134 
 This judicial behavior is not explained by modifications to the rele-
vant Executive Order.  Courts did this on their own.  Nor is the behav-
ior an automatic step from practical institutional constraints.  An 
expertise gap can be narrowed by appointing an independent expert 
witness,135 a technical advisor,136 or a special master137 with security 
clearance.  But apparently the judiciary is not excited by the idea of de-
veloping national security expertise. 
                                                                                                                                
cords substantial weight, a court shall accord substantial weight to an affidavit of an agency 
concerning the agency’s determination as to technical feasibility under paragraph (2)(C) and 
subsection (b) and reproducibility under paragraph (3)(B).”).  For helpful context from the pro-
court perspective, see Deyling, supra note 128, at 70–82. 
131 See, e.g., Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 292 (2d Cir. 1999); Hayden v. National Sec. 
Agency/Central Sec. Serv., 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that in camera review is 
neither necessary nor appropriate once the government submits adequately specific affidavits—
absent contrary evidence or evidence of bad faith); FRANCK, supra note 21, at 143.  But cf. CONF. 
REP. NO. 93-1200, supra note 130, at 9 (suggesting an affidavit process to demonstrate that 
documents are “clearly exempt” before in camera review, which would be necessary “in many 
cases”). 
132 See John A. Bourdeau, Annotation, What Matters Are Exempt from Disclosure Under Free-
dom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1)), 169 ALR FED. 495, 515 (2001). 
133 See id. at 514–15; Deyling, supra note 128, at 67, 82, 86–87. 
134 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1318 (Oct. 17, 1974); cf. SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & 
PROC., SEN. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCEBOOK: LEGISLATIVE 
MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 189 (1974) (noting a rejected Senate Judici-
ary Committee version that would have limited judicial review to “reasonable basis”). 
135 See FED. R. EVID. 706. 
136 Cf. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 203 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding 
inherent and statutory authority to appoint an advisor to tutor the court on fishery questions). 
137 See FED. R. CIV. P. 53; Deyling, supra note 128, at 105–11 (advocating their use, along with 
document sampling, at least in cases involving a large volume of records). 
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 This does not mean FOIA is ineffectual.  Statutes can affect decisions 
far upstream from litigation.138  Knowing that a court will ask for an ex-
planation might prompt the executive to release documents based on 
the simple prospect of suit.  There seems to be consensus that the ex-
ecutive habitually over-classifies as an initial matter,139 and maybe 
FOIA never had a chance to prevent that behavior.140  Nevertheless, 
FOIA requests and even gentle versions of judicial review can make a 
positive difference.141 
 
2. Quixotic access norms 
 Rarely have courts held that federal constitutional law points in the 
other direction, toward public access.142  There is unsettled territory 
here, however.  Recent disputes over the executive’s conduct of the war 
on terrorism exposed disagreement in the lower courts.  This conflict 
was partly due to an absence of concrete guidance on public access to 
the executive branch.  Supreme Court treatment of constitutional access 
claims does not squarely address that question.  Instead, the develop-
ment of these cases can be divided into three stages: no access, court ac-
cess, and silence. 
 a. No constitutionally compelled access?  Around the same time execu-
tive privilege and secrecy in the name of national security hit the judi-
cial agenda, the Supreme Court decided some information access 
claims grounded in constitutional law.  The claimants typically asserted 
First Amendment rights, and not without reason.  “Speech” and 
“press” refer to communication, which is a social process.  One can 
logically read the Amendment as promoting a system of communica-
                                                 
138 See Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 653, 656 (1985). 
139 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SE-
CRECY, S. Doc. No. 105-2, at 36 (1997) (collecting sources and noting one Defense Department 
white paper to the contrary); Too Many Secrets: Overclassification as a Barrier to Critical Information 
Sharing, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Security, Emerging Threats & Int’l Relations of the 
House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 1–2 (2004) (statement of Rep. Shays); id. at 
23 (statement of William J. Leonard, Director, Information Security Oversight Office, National 
Archives and Records Administration) (“It is no secret that the government classifies too much 
information.”). 
140 Not without a more meaningful penalty provision, anyway.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) 
(permitting assessment of attorney fees against the United States); id. § 552(a)(4)(F) (calling for 
investigation of and possible disciplinary action against an employee for suspected arbitrary or 
capricious withholding, if records were ordered disclosed); id. § 552(a)(4)(G) (authorizing con-
tempt penalties against employees if a court order is disobeyed). 
141 See Deyling, supra note 128, at 110–11 (providing an example). 
142 See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 219 (2d ed. 2002) (“Thus, it seems clear that 
the government can generally restrict access to its own documents . . . .”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-4, at 814 n. 36 (2d ed. 1988); id. § 12-20, at 955. 
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tion143 in which audiences possess interests in parity with speakers.  In 
fact, the Court had long accepted listeners’ First Amendment inter-
ests.144  And the judiciary was indicating that “political speech” and 
“robust” debate on “public issues” were at the core of its concerns.145  
The trick for claimants was overcoming the objections of unwilling 
speakers.  An audience might have a constitutionally respected interest 
in receiving information about their government, but that might not in-
clude information from or facilitated by their government.146  The early 
access cases saw just this distinction and produced a short string of 
government victories. 
 Foreshadowing came with the Supreme Court’s holding that the ex-
ecutive was not obliged to permit foreign travel to Cuba for a personal 
fact-finding mission.147  Such cases do not directly resolve questions 
about access to U.S. government-held information, and they can be lim-
ited by the countervailing concerns of foreign policy and border con-
trol.  But the Court went further in situations involving domestic 
prisons.  Despite the significance of newsgathering activities to recog-
nized constitutional values, journalists were denied face-to-face access 
to inmates of their choosing.148  Justice Stewart frowned on the idea that 
“the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to 
make available to journalists sources of information not available to 
members of the public generally.”149  The culminating case in this set is 
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,150 which denied press access to locations in a jail 
that were off-limits to the rest of the public.  At one point the plurality 
put it bluntly and broadly: “Neither the First Amendment nor the Four-
                                                 
143 See, e.g., THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3 (1970). 
144 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 756–57 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Martin v. City of Struthers, 
319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stressing 
audience interests and upholding a right-of-reply regulation in broadcasting). 
145 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal 
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of gov-
ernmental affairs.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
146 Cf. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 756 (“Freedom of speech presupposes a willing 
speaker.”). 
147 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 3–4, 16–17 (1965) (pointing to a problem of claimant insin-
cerity); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756, 759–60, 769–70 (1972) (rejecting profes-
sors’ First Amendment challenge to the executive’s denial of a visa to a Belgian advocate of 
communism, where Congress had delegated power to exclude aliens and the executive could 
provide “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the exclusion). 
148 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830–32, 834–35 (1974) (stressing parity in treatment 
with the rest of the public, and alternative means of obtaining information); Saxbe v. Washing-
ton Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
149 Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972). 
150 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
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teenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government informa-
tion or sources of information within the government’s control.”151 
If one were so inclined, Houchins and the like could be waved away 
because the Court was largely preoccupied with the question whether 
“the press” was entitled to greater access than others,152 or because the 
Court was placing special limits on judicial interference with the physi-
cal management of government facilities, particularly prisons,153 or 
even because the claimant relied on the First Amendment rather than a 
structural argument about democracy.154  A broader message was nev-
ertheless difficult to ignore. 
 b. The puzzling case of court access.  Then the message became mixed.  
In four cases decided over eight years, the Supreme Court established 
that criminal trial proceedings ordinarily must be open to the public.155  
Despite the language in Houchins, a majority relied on the First 
Amendment and democratic theory.  Access to criminal trials promotes 
an informed discussion of governmental affairs, which in turn might 
“ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and 
contribute to our republican system of self-government.”156  And the 
presumption of access is strong.  It is not enough for the defendant, the 
prosecutor, and the trial judge to agree on closure.  Closed criminal 
proceedings are unconstitutional “unless specific, on the record find-
ings are made demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher 
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”157  Closure was 
rejected, as a matter of constitutional law, in all four cases.  Nor have 
court access claims been limited to criminal trials.  Aside from certain 
                                                 
151 Id. at 15 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.); cf. id. at 16–19 (Stewart, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting special accommodations for the press when they enter spaces already open). 
152 See id. at 7 (“[T]hey argue for an implied special right of access . . . .”). 
153 See id. at 8 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)). 
154 Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality opinion of 
Burger, C.J.) (relying on the First Amendment shortly after similar arguments were rejected in 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (focusing on the Sixth Amendment)); id. at 584–
85 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
155 See id. (arising from defendant’s motion to close his entire criminal trial, which was un-
opposed by the prosecution); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (in-
volving a state statute mandating closure during the testimony of children who are alleged 
victims of certain sex crimes); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press-
Enterprise I) (arising from defense- and prosecution-supported motions to close most of voir 
dire and seal the transcript thereof); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) 
(Press-Enterprise II) (involving the sealed transcript of a pretrial preliminary hearing); accord El 
Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993) (addressing a rule that closed prob-
able cause hearings unless the defendant requested otherwise). 
156 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604–05. 
157 Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13–14 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Globe Newspa-
per, 457 U.S. at 606–07 (“Where . . . the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to in-
hibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by 
a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”). 
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other aspects of criminal prosecution,158 lower courts have extended 
presumptive public access to civil judicial proceedings.159 
 These decisions might not conflict with Houchins.  The Court relied 
on a long tradition, stretching back to the Norman Conquest, of public 
access to criminal trials.  The same cannot be said for prisons or jails.  
On the other hand, these cases combined tradition with good policy: 
the idea that access would enhance the legitimacy and quality of judi-
cial proceedings.160  It is not known whether a less-lengthy tradition (a 
century? fifty years?) bars presumptive rights of access if the policy jus-
tification is persuasive. 
 There is reason to think that the broader access claim was on the ta-
ble.  In certain respects, these public access victories came in the least 
likely of places.  Criminal trials raise legitimate fears about the influ-
ence of popular opinion.  It is always possible that restrictions on state 
power posed by procedural and substantive law will weaken in the face 
of populist scrutiny, especially when their ephemeral systemic value is 
confronted by the concrete needs of the state in its effort to convict an 
identified defendant.  Even if one believes that the criminal justice sys-
tem was too insulated from popular sentiment, it is unclear why the 
need for popular pressure was greater in the courtrooms of the 1980s 
than anywhere else in American government.  The court access cases 
suggested that a larger principle might be established. 
 c. Silence and some confusion.  But that move was not made, at least 
not in the Supreme Court.  The Court has been essentially silent on the 
matter for over a decade.161  Not surprisingly, lower courts have gener-
ated some disagreement over access to executive information and op-
erations.  Several courts refuse to push the constitutional law of access 
beyond federal courts regulating themselves (and the state courts).162  
                                                 
158 See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (plea agree-
ment). 
159 See, e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067–70 (3d Cir. 1984) (civil tri-
als); Lauren Gilbert, When Democracy Dies Behind Closed Doors: The First Amendment and “Special 
Interest” Hearings, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 759 & n. 105 (2003) (collecting cases). 
160 See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606. 
161 A limited exception is Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 
(1999) (holding that a for-profit publishing company could not assert a facial challenge to a 
state law that demanded a promise of noncommercial use before disclosing arrestee addresses).  
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion did state that “California could decide not to give out arrestee 
information at all without violating the First Amendment.”  Id. at 40. 
162 See, e.g., ACLU of Mississippi v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir. 1990) (denying 
complete public access to Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission records when pitted 
against constitutional privacy concerns); Calder v. IRS, 890 F.2d 781, 783 (5th Cir. 1989) (deny-
ing access to Al Capone’s tax records); cf. JB Pictures, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 87 
F.3d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding a policy denying public access for viewing the arrival 
of deceased soldiers at Dover Air Force Base, which was adopted shortly before Operation De-
sert Storm, although assuming that judicial balancing was allowed); Capitol Cities Media, Inc. 
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Still, that view is not unanimous,163 and several lower courts are willing 
to consider access arguments on the merits of individual cases. 
 A sharp conflict emerged when the executive closed hundreds of 
“special interest” deportation proceedings to the public.  The people 
subject to these proceedings were assertedly connected to the govern-
ment’s 9/11 investigation (although support for terrorism was certainly 
not the only basis for deportation).  Because of the alleged connection 
between confidentiality and the needs of effective law enforcement, 
immigration policy, and national security, a fair prediction might have 
been a clear government victory.  But the Sixth Circuit split with the 
Third,164 and the Supreme Court denied review.165  In the final analysis, 
the arguments for secrecy and access both suffered from critical weak-
nesses.  For example, outsiders had some access to these detainees and 
knew that the proceedings were going on because the detainees were 
not held incommunicado—and because they were not held incommu-
nicado it was difficult to see how much the executive gained by closing 
the hearings.  The lesson is not about that particular controversy, but 
that there is judicial interest in boosting executive access claims.166 
                                                                                                                                
v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (rejecting a claim of access to files of a state en-
vironmental agency, but vindicating a claim of unequal access). 
163 See Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of West Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 180–81 (3d Cir. 
1999) (dicta regarding access to local planning board meetings); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United 
States Dep’t of Agriculture, 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (using constitutional doubt in a 
case about access to a list of voters within an agricultural marketing order); Society of Profes-
sional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 573, 576–79 (D. Utah 1985) (formal 
agency fact-finding hearings to investigate a mining disaster), remanded with instructions to va-
cate judgment as moot, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cir. 1987); cf. Cable News Network v. American 
Broadcasting Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1244–45 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (granting a preliminary injunc-
tion against the total denial of television access to pool coverage of White House events and 
presidential activities—an action taken by the White House to force plaintiffs into reaching 
their own rotation agreement); Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 
177, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (regarding arrest records). 
164 For what it’s worth, more federal judges voted to reject closure in the absence of (addi-
tional) determinations that secrecy was needed.  See North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002) (granting a preliminary injunction in favor of ac-
cess), rev’d, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (2–1 vote), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003); Detroit Free 
Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (granting a preliminary injunction in 
favor of access), aff’d, 303 F.3d 681, 711 (6th Cir. 2002) (3–0 vote) (“Open proceedings, with a 
vigorous and scrutinizing press, serve to ensure the durability of our democracy.”).  Plus, the 
Third Circuit conceded that the experience-and-policy inquiry of the court access cases applied 
to these executive proceedings.  It rested its decision on the narrower ground that the district 
court had underplayed the executive’s national security concerns.  See North Jersey Media, 308 
F.3d at 200–01. 
165 The executive opposed certiorari, partly on the ground that it was deporting these peo-
ple so quickly that the case was about to lose practical significance.  See Brief for Respondents in 
Opposition at 9–10, North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003). 
166 Cf. ACLU v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 339 F. Supp. 2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (order-
ing certain executive agencies to respond to 11-month-old FOIA requests for documents regard-
ing post-9/11 detainees; relying on the purposes of the Act). 
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d. Leaks and confidential news sources.  There are other pockets of 
constitutional law affecting information access.  The courts are usually 
happy to protect the dissemination of truthful information about gov-
ernment by those unaffiliated with government.  Attempts to halt such 
dissemination by either subsequent punishment or prior restraint are 
extremely difficult to justify in court.167  Hence the media’s swift victory 
in the Pentagon Papers case could not be more different from the delicate 
and deferential treatment of national security concerns just one year 
later in EPA v. Mink.  Granted, there must be limits to this immunity.  
Combat plans, weapons technology, and the identity of secret agents 
are almost certainly in a class of their own.168  No one believes prosecut-
ing true spies poses any constitutional difficulty.  Otherwise, and as a 
matter of First Amendment law, information ordinarily may flow freely 
after it escapes the executive’s efforts to withhold it.  This protection 
reduces the threat of legal sanction against mass media and others who 
traffic in information about government, and should make them more 
interested in acquiring it. 
But this immunity for dissemination is not necessarily immunity for 
disclosure.  Will executive officials be as interested in revealing informa-
tion as outsiders will be in asking for it?  The answer is often yes, con-
sidering the regular reliance on unnamed sources in news reports.169  
Law plays some role here.  True, insiders might disclose information 
purely on conscience or spite and regardless of other consequences.  
For other officials, legal protection for acts of disclosure may coax them 
into providing information to outsiders.  For example, government em-
ployees possess a modest First Amendment protection from certain 
kinds of adverse employment action. “Public concern” for the informa-
tion disclosed may overcome any legitimate government interest in 
                                                 
167 See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (subse-
quent punishment); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (prior 
restraint, despite asserted national security concerns). 
168 See generally Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 283–85 (1981) (involving exposure of foreign 
CIA agents and passport revocation); United States v. The Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. 
Wis. 1979) (involving nuclear technology and a preliminary injunction); Sunstein, supra note 11, 
at 905–12. 
169 A recent survey is Project for Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News Media 2004: 
An Annual Report on American Journalism (content analysis of newspapers with tables and 
charts), 
<http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/narrative_newspapers_contentanalysis.asp?cat=2&medi
a=2> (reporting that 45 percent of sampled front-page stories from sixteen selected newspapers 
in 2003 included at least one unnamed source).  A study by the Center for Media and Public Af-
fairs found that use of anonymous sources was less frequent in 2001 compared to 1981 in net-
work newscasts and the front-page stories of six selected newspapers.  See Center for Media 
and Public Affairs, Study Finds Big Drop in Anonymous Sourcing: “Off the Record” Quotes Down by 
1/3 Since Reagan Years (May 30, 2005) (available at http://www.cmpa.com) (reporting a 33 per-
cent decline). 
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punishing the employee.170  If a civil servant publicly discloses law vio-
lations or gross mismanagement, then she might have statutory protec-
tion from adverse personnel action.171  Furthermore, leaky officials can 
attempt to evade detection by those who would oppose disclosure.  
Current legal rules may help.  Journalists sometimes enjoy a privilege 
against revelation of their confidential sources,172 while the First 
Amendment does not bar civil suits against those who break promises 
to maintain source confidentiality.173 
These rules are important in their own right, but they are not a sub-
stitute for a substantive law of public access.  One critique is that cur-
rent rules insufficiently protect insiders and their media outlets.174  
Government employees must be willing to risk professional, personal, 
and reputational injury,175 without guarantee that they will be ade-
quately rewarded according to the public benefit produced.  A second 
concern persists even when government sources are fully immunized 
from retaliation.  In this informal system of public access, reporters 
must be willing to build close relationships with government officials.  
Such nonadversarial interaction leads to risks of officials co-opting and 
                                                 
170 See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–48 (1983) (indicating deferential balancing). 
171 See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a), (h) (authorizing employees to seek relief from the Merit Systems 
Protection Board, with judicial review); id. § 2302(a)(2)(B) (describing covered employees, who 
do not include those exempted by the President); id. § 2302(b)(8) (describing protected disclo-
sures, which do not include public revelation of classified information). 
172 The law of “reporter’s privilege” is complicated.  The Supreme Court rejected a First 
Amendment privilege for journalists in the grand jury context more than thirty years ago.  See 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); cf. id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring).  But since then, 
most states enacted shield laws which apply in state judicial proceedings and federal diversity 
jurisdiction, see Laurence B. Alexander & Ellen M. Bush, Shield Laws on Trial: State Courts’ Inter-
pretation of the Journalist’s Statutory Privilege, 23 J. LEGIS. 215, 217 & nn. 17–18 (1997) (collecting 
statutes and noting additional protection from state courts); FED. R. EVID. 501, and many lower 
federal courts have recognized a qualified privilege as a matter of First Amendment law, or 
under their authority to generate privileges in the Rules of Evidence, or both, see, e.g., Riley v. 
Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 713, 715 (3d Cir. 1979); infra Part III.C.1.  There is no simple restatement 
that captures the substance of these various sources of law. 
173 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–71 (1991). 
174 See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (endorsing a constructive 
trust on profits from a former agent’s book, which was not pre-screened by the CIA—even 
though the government did not contend that classified information was disclosed); Barnard v. 
Jackson County, 43 F.3d 1218, 1224–25 (8th Cir. 1995) (doubting a public employee’s First 
Amendment right to leak information, and denying it to a county auditor); Cheh, supra note 9, 
at 701–02, 709, 712, 719. 
175 See Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The first amendment nei-
ther guarantees that a whistle-blower can engage in a cost-free exercise of his right of free ex-
pression, nor requires appellees to guarantee good feelings at all times between employees.”); 
see also U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BD., THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: RE-
SULT OF THE MERIT PRINCIPLES SURVEY 2000, at 35, 50 (2003) (reporting that 44 percent of respon-
dents who had made disclosures regarding misconduct or dangers felt that they were then 
retaliated against or threatened with retaliation); Family of Iraq Abuse Whistleblower Threatened, 
REUTERS, Aug. 16, 2004. 
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manipulating news coverage for their personal or political objectives.  
This issue points to the most fundamental problem.  Informal systems 
of public access are ultimately unambitious.  They lack a normative 
standard for judging when disclosure is appropriate, either in individ-
ual cases or overall.176  The mix of information will reflect a confluence 
of incentives and opportunities, some of which will be temporary and 
unpredictable, none of which is calibrated to a standard of socially de-
sirable openness or secrecy.  Disclosure will be driven by the individual 
judgment of government employees—acting on motivations such as 
vanity and intrabranch factional warfare,177 as well as their subjective 
estimation of the public good—with additional filtering by those of-
fered the information for distribution.  We would not have to worry 
about differing individual standards if this system disclosed to the pub-
lic all information about government operations.  But it will not, and we 
would not want it to. 
There is one proper purpose for which informal channels of disclo-
sure are uniquely suited: combating deep secrecy.178  Sometimes infor-
mation outsiders are too ignorant to know that relevant information is 
being concealed.  Even formulating the right questions may require as-
sistance from an insider.  Once suspicions arise, nonjudicial pressure 
might achieve a swift, inexpensive, and appropriate degree of public 
access.  But no pressure point in the executive branch can be exploited 
without reason to believe that there is more to know.179  Investigative 
reporting, source confidentiality, and the law that protects them are 
therefore important components in an acceptable system of public ac-
cess.  They should not be the only components. 
 
B. Unsatisfying Defenses 
 This state of affairs presents a few puzzles.  Our constitutional law, 
as declared by our courts, affects public access to government informa-
tion.  Sometimes it speaks to the subject directly.  And yet on other oc-
casions it is silent.  Can we account for a system in which courts wield 
constitutional law to protect the executive from disclosures demanded 
by citizens and authorized by Congress—but that leaves public access 
                                                 
176 This point was argued forcefully in Sunstein, supra note 11, at 902–03. 
177 See STEPHEN HESS, THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION ch. 7 (1984); HEDRICK SMITH, THE 
POWER GAME: HOW WASHINGTON WORKS 432–37 (1988). 
178 See supra note 42 (distinguishing deep from shallow secrets). 
179 Disclosure to internal investigatory groups, such as an Office of Inspector General, 
might suffice.  This course does, however, identify the complaining party to at least one ele-
ment of the executive.  Another option is disclosure to Congress, although it is less likely to 
prompt action if the President’s party has a working majority, especially in the relevant com-
mittee. 
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claims without constitutional backing—except when judicial proceed-
ings are at issue? 
 It is highly unlikely that narrowly conventional sources of constitu-
tional meaning entail this arrangement.  The text of the Federal Consti-
tution certainly does not track the distinctions we find in precedent.  In 
fact, it provides little guidance.  Consider first the document’s refer-
ences to disclosure.  The President must provide “Information of the 
State of the Union,” but only “from time to time,” and the addressee is 
Congress.180  The text also signals a governmental commitment to in-
form the public about taxes and spending.  Article I declares that “a 
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all 
public Money shall be published”—but again, “from time to time.”181  
The Sixth Amendment guarantees “the accused” the right to a public 
trial;182 and few will object if we read “due process of law”183 to require 
some effort to notify a private party before the government takes that 
party’s liberty or property.184  The information demands of other citi-
zens or voters could be distinguished and rejected.185  But sometimes 
they are not.  The Supreme Court has mandated public access to crimi-
nal judicial proceedings, and lower courts have extended that analysis 
to other forms of adjudication, without even restricting those claims to 
“the press.”  Constitutional text is not driving access rights. 
 Openness is not the only idea sparingly addressed by the text.  The 
Constitution mentions secrecy only once.  Article I obligates the House 
and Senate to keep Journals of their proceedings and to publish them 
“from time to time . . . excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment 
require Secrecy.”186  A subsequent provision might require Journal pub-
                                                 
180 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  In Federalist No. 77, Hamilton refers to this activity as a “power” 
of the President, while portraying the executive’s prerogatives as modest.  See FEDERALIST NO. 
77, at 463 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  “Duty” sounds more like it. 
181 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; cf. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (denying 
taxpayer standing to assert this clause against secrecy in CIA appropriations and expenditures); 
Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 152–56 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (denying that FOIA solves the standing 
problem).  But cf. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (granting a group of voters standing under 
federal election law to demand access from the FEC to information about a competing interest 
group); infra Part III.B. 
182 See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1979). 
183 U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1. 
184 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985) (involving notice to 
class members in damages class actions); Greene v. Lindsay, 456 U.S. 444, 445 (1982) (involving 
notice of eviction actions to public housing tenants); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) 
(involving the state’s duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the criminally accused).  
I leave aside the validity of gaps between primary conduct rules for private parties and decision 
rules for government officials.  See Dan-Cohen, supra note 53. 
185 Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317, 320 (1950) (address-
ing notice by publication as a substitute for individualized notice, not as a public right). 
186 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; see also id. (providing for recording of the yeas and nays upon 
a one-fifth vote); 2 FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 29, at 290, 292–94, 301. 
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lication of the names of those voting for and against a veto override.187  
The portions of congressional Journals kept secret otherwise seem to be 
within legislative discretion.  A formalist conceivably could infer that 
the federal government lacks discretion to withhold information about 
its operations beyond such explicit authority.  The First Amendment 
could support that negative inference.  It is the textual basis for opening 
certain judicial proceedings, but its words do not distinguish among 
components of the state.188  And yet contemporary law doesn’t work 
this way either.  The President, for example, enjoys some authority to 
withhold information as a matter of executive privilege.  Likewise, 
FIOA and FACA have been judicially adjusted (or contorted) to serve 
executive interests, without an explicit constitutional command. 
 Arguments from history or tradition better reflect contemporary 
doctrine.  They were, after all, some of the reasons given for mandating 
open trials.189  That practice is older than the Constitution.  Further-
more, current federal constitutional law does not include justiciable 
public access claims for congressional proceedings.190  Here, too, early 
founding era history seems consistent with contemporary law.  The 
Senate met in closed session for its first several years of operation.191  
Indeed, the Constitutional Convention was closed to the public.192  And 
Publius recognized the value of secrecy to the effective conduct of di-
                                                 
187 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (stating that the names “shall be entered on the Journal of 
each House respectively”).  This clause does not explicitly prohibit a majority vote in Congress 
to keep those parts of the Journals secret under Article I, § 5.  But that authority would make it 
easier for Members of Congress to remain anonymous than the text of Article I, § 7, seems to 
contemplate.  Accord Vermeule, supra note 44, at 414 n. 171 (addressing votes to keep secret 
Journal entries on roll call votes). 
188 The Amendment does single out “Congress” as the institution prohibited from making 
laws abridging the freedom of speech and press.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  This makes limitation 
of rights of public access to judicial proceedings even more difficult to explain with constitu-
tional text. 
189 See supra Part II.A.2.b. 
190 Cf. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (denying taxpayer standing to assert 
the accounts clause of Article I, § 9, cl. 7). 
191 See Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 281 & n. 229 (2003). 
192 See CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 134–39 (1928). 
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plomacy by the executive.193  These sources could yield public access to 
judicial proceedings and nothing else.194 
 But several arguments counsel against ending the discussion here.  
First is the point that courts have not confined their reasoning to his-
torical analysis.  Executive privilege was recognized as a matter of con-
stitutional structure, and access to judicial proceedings was triggered 
by a combination of tradition and good policy in light of institutional 
function.  A second objection covers those who ignore history in consti-
tutional interpretation.  That group might be small, but certainly there 
are several other sources with which to construct constitutional law in 
this area. 
More important, the history that we do have can be used for a lot or 
a little.  We could restrict the significance of the historical record to only 
conservative inferences.  The closure of the Constitutional Convention 
might be dismissed as the stand-alone choice of a deliberative body that 
produced a proposal for public consideration, not a model for practices 
under the proposed government.  Pockets of secrecy for deliberation, 
diplomacy, and foreign affairs could be constitutionally guarded with-
out extending the protection to every activity in the executive and legis-
lative branches.  Conversely, public access to judicial proceedings need 
not be immunized from arguments for closure based on contemporary 
needs.  Finally, two developments since the founding should be consid-
ered.  The Senate opened to the public in 1795,195 and openness-in-
government efforts have been an important part of our tradition since 
then.  Moreover, the founding generation did not confront a large fed-
eral bureaucracy built for modern society.  Our post-New Deal federal 
                                                 
193 See FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 392–93 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (Jay) (discussing the Presi-
dent’s power to negotiate treaties); FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Hamilton) (“Decision, activity, se-
crecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more 
eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number.”); FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 452 
(Hamilton) (arguing against a House role in treaty ratification: “[a]ccurate and comprehensive 
knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and 
uniform sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy, and dispatch, are incompatible with 
the genius of a body so variable and so numerous”). 
194 Cf. O’BRIEN, supra note 9, ch. 2 (contending that the history of the First Amendment indi-
cates not access rights, but rather a fight over more rudimentary rights to publish); Martin D. 
Halstuk, Policy of Secrecy—Pattern of Deception: What Federalist Leaders Thought About a Public 
Right to Know, 1794–98, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 51 (2002) (reviewing events surrounding Jay’s 
Treaty and the XYZ affair).  But cf. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 110 (1985) 
(quoting a passage from Cato’s Letters developing a trustee conception of government officials, 
who should want their deeds publicly examined); Dyk, supra note 11, at 959 (quoting James 
Madison, Report of the Committee to Whom Were Referred the Communications of Various States, 
Relative to the Resolutions of the Last General Assembly of this State, Concerning the Alien and Sedition 
Laws (Virginia House of Delegates, 1799–1800)). 
195 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 16 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).  A pre-1795 exception was made for a 
Senate election contest.  See id. 
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government has a scope and character unforeseen by those involved in 
eighteenth-century constitution making.  Significant accountability con-
cerns are raised by the new government. 
 If neither text nor history explains current law, the debate might 
turn to inferences from constitutional structure.  We have already 
sketched the terms of that discussion.196  But the conclusion is painfully 
opaque.  Plausible inferences point in more than one direction.  Execu-
tive efficacy demands confidentiality for certain circumstances, and that 
same immunity from public scrutiny generates conflict with democratic 
premises.  The same might be said of judicial operations.197  It takes lit-
tle imagination to see information access and executive secrecy as nec-
essary components of the federal government.  It takes much more to 
reconcile them. 
 Finally, a popular argument against public access claims should be 
noted and rejected.  Some commentators find it helpful to characterize 
the U.S. Constitution as guaranteeing “negative” as opposed to “posi-
tive” or “affirmative” rights.  The second category, which involves law-
suits demanding that the state take action for the benefit of a 
complaining citizen, is assertedly left to political discretion.  In fact, this 
bifurcation of rights claims worked its way into the public access field 
at a fairly early stage.198  And it is not a bad way of describing many 
constitutional case outcomes,199 particularly where citizens have asked 
federal courts to establish social welfare rights.200 
 But the positive/negative rights distinction is more distracting than 
helpful for present purposes.  Most broadly, it just seems wrong to say 
that liberal democracy entails no affirmative constitutional obligations 
on the part of government officials.  If nothing else, they surely have a 
duty to facilitate elections.  Providing information about government 
operations might not be far off.  But even if all judicially enforceable 
constitutional law must involve “negative rights,” many public access 
claims fit that category.  Secrecy takes effort.201  Among other measures, 
                                                 
196 See supra Parts I, II.A.1 & II.A.2.b. 
197 However, the purposeful lack of electoral accountability in federal courts might weaken 
the defense of the Richmond Newspapers line of cases.  For an argument nevertheless favoring 
presumptive access to adjudicative proceedings in the federal executive, see Kitrosser, supra 
note 11, at 100. 
198 See, e.g., O’BRIEN, supra note 9, at 145–46; see also Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment 
on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 1285 (2005) (“[T]he 
[First] Amendment is a shield, not a sword.”). 
199 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
200 See infra note 269. 
201 Cf. STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT MIT 202 (1987) (“Informa-
tion wants to be free because it has become so cheap to distribute, copy, and recombine—too 
cheap to meter.  It wants to be expensive because it can be immeasurably valuable to the recipi-
ent.”); id. at 211. 
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access to information is restricted by closing doors, soundproofing 
committee rooms, adding electronic firewalls, and firing loose-lipped 
employees.  The positive/negative line will not help us make intelligent 
decisions about justiciable public access claims.  Now, it might be that 
the distinction is actually driven by a lack of confidence in the judiciary.  
One might oppose the judicial definition and enforcement of certain 
types of constitutional values, especially when they impose serious 
costs on other institutions.  This objection is undeniably powerful.  But 
it should start an argument about institutional choice and design,202 
rather than end the discussion with a crude generalization of U.S. con-
stitutional law. 
 
C. Institutional Competence 
 There are no simple answers for the panoply of substantive access 
issues—when access demands are legitimate and substantial, when 
they are overridden by individual privacy concerns or law enforcement 
needs, and so on.  There is another angle from which to approach the 
matter, however.  It shifts attention from particularized disputes to 
questions about who should resolve them.203  We might not know ex-
actly how to solve a given access dispute, but it might be easier to fig-
ure out the best allotment of authority to decide access issues.  Ideas 
about constitutional structure matter here, too.204 
Courts themselves have used questions about institutional compe-
tence to foreclose some access claims.  The plurality opinion in Houchins 
v. KQED, Inc.205 is a good start.  Chief Justice Burger’s basic message 
was that the rules for access to government information should be a 
policy question for the political process.206  We can break out two gen-
                                                 
202 See infra Parts II.C. & III. 
203 See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 
U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 208 (1988) (“[T]he courts must be authorized—indeed, required—to con-
sider their own, and the other branches’, limitations and propensities when they construct doc-
trine to govern future cases.”); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and 
Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003). 
204 Notions of constitutional structure are used for a different purpose in this section.  In the 
last section, structure provided little help in resolving substantive access disputes—that is, 
whether a given part of the government should be open or closed as a matter of constitutional 
law.  Here, structure is relevant to comparative institutional capacities, which help us choose an 
institutional arrangement for addressing substantive access disputes.  A constitution might be 
vague about substantive outcomes yet more instructive about where disputes should be re-
solved. 
205 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
206 Id. at 12 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.) (“[Respondents’ argument] invites the Court 
to involve itself in what is clearly a legislative task which the Constitution has left to the politi-
cal processes.”); see id. at 12–16.  Similarity to the political questions doctrine is obvious. 
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eral reasons for this allocation of responsibility away from the federal 
judiciary. 
First, there is skepticism about the courts’ own competence.  There 
are no obvious constitutional rules for adjudicating public access 
claims, and the judiciary has reservations about generating these rules.  
Part of the concern involves transition costs.  As the plurality put it, 
“[b]ecause the Constitution affords no guidelines, absent statutory stan-
dards, hundreds of judges would . . . be at large to fashion ad hoc stan-
dards, in individual cases, according to their own ideas of what seems 
‘desirable’ or ‘expedient.’”207  Another part of the incompetence argu-
ment is a doubt that courts will be able to see and accommodate all sig-
nificant interests.  Many legitimate interests must be reconciled to build 
an acceptable system of public access.  The most obvious candidates are 
national defense, law enforcement, personal privacy, trade secrets, and 
candid deliberation within the executive branch.  But there might be 
more.  Even if these interests are recognized, it could take considerable 
time and effort before courts produce something more than ad hoc re-
sults.  It is thus reasonable to conclude that courts should be disquali-
fied from the job of system design.208  Finally, in certain classes of cases, 
courts might be incompetent to adjudicate even if they have a test to 
use.  That is the theme of FOIA Exemption 1 cases, which involve na-
tional security.209 
 Second, information about government operations might be ob-
tained by alternative means.  The plurality stressed this point in 
Houchins, where the alternatives included legislation, oversight and in-
vestigation by other officials, judicial inquiry during criminal proceed-
ings, media or public pressure on politicians for disclosure, and access 
to human sources other than the inmate population.210  A similar set of 
alternatives is often available for federal executive operations.  Informa-
                                                 
207 Id. at 14; see also id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring); BICKEL, supra note 9, at 87 (“The First 
Amendment offers no formula describing the degree of freedom of information that is consis-
tent with necessary privacy of government decision-making.”); BOLLINGER, supra note 9, at 146 
(worrying about “the massiveness of the enterprise”); BeVier, supra note 9, at 506–08. 
208 Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 105–07 (recognizing that “[g]overnment can compromise 
public deliberation at least as effectively through secrecy as through censorship” but suggesting 
access as a judicially underenforced First Amendment norm, and FOIA as a reasonable re-
sponse); Strauss, supra note 19, at 358–59 (arguing that access is underenforced by courts for 
constitutional reasons). 
209 See supra Part II.A.1.c.  Judicial reticence might be simple shirking.  Public access claims 
are more work regardless of court competence.  I have no good way of assessing this problem.  
It is also conceivable that federal courts are lackeys for the executive, to which they owe life 
tenure.  This might be true at times, but its strong form is inconsistent with, for example, recent 
cases involving the war on terrorism.  See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Hamdi v. Rums-
feld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
210 See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 12–13 & n.7 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.) (citing FOIA); see 
also id. at 16 & n.* (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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tion might become public from internal investigations by the executive 
itself, leaks and whistleblowers, congressional oversight,211 and indi-
vidualized due process rights to notice.  Similar arguments can be 
made insofar as the concern is too much disclosure.  If identified, em-
ployees making unauthorized disclosures risk professional, personal, 
and reputational injury.  The executive does not need judicial approval 
before taking these actions. 
 These two reasons—incompetence and alternatives—are powerful 
in certain respects and incomplete in others.  Surely courts are unsuit-
able arbiters when all of these considerations point in the same direc-
tion.  It makes practical sense to restrict judicial authority when 
constitutional text provides little substantive guidance, court compe-
tence is otherwise in question, and reliable alternative methods of dis-
pute resolution are available.  A freestanding constitutional claim to 
information about legally authorized military or intelligence opera-
tions, for example, is fanciful.  But public access to judicial proceedings 
is qualitatively different.  Courts are rightly comfortable managing 
their own operations (and probably uncomfortable recognizing unoffi-
cial methods of extracting information about their business).  Putting 
aside objections to the U.S. Supreme Court managing access to state ju-
diciaries, it is not shocking that federal courts have generated constitu-
tional tests for judging court closure.  Neither FOIA nor any other 
federal access legislation covers the judiciary; the Richmond Newspapers 
line of cases can be seen as an effort by the courts to self-regulate public 
access without the kind of congressional interference suffered by the 
executive. 
Not every judicial move is as easily explained, however.  How can 
institutional competence concerns underwrite the Supreme Court’s rec-
ognition of executive privilege as constitutional law?  Denying the 
privilege in Nixon fits with an account of courts striving to preserve 
their own prerogatives.  Yet the underlying endorsement of executive 
privilege could interfere with congressional demands for executive in-
formation, and in any case displays a confidence in designing access 
rules that is lacking in other areas.  Why would a court feel competent 
to fashion an executive privilege—perhaps a set of overlapping privi-
leges212—but incompetent to articulate the elements of a public access 
claim to executive-held documents?  Was there good reason to believe 
that presidents lack alternative defenses to improper congressional (or 
                                                 
211 Cf. Ferejohn, supra note 41, at 134 (indicating that legislatures have more leverage over 
executive agencies than voters have over elected officials, because of advantages in organiza-
tion, reward/punishment options, and information about government institutions). 
212 See supra text accompanying note 100. 
 
 
Draft of November 22, 2005 page 46  
judicial) demands?  And if courts are built in a way that makes them 
incompetent to judge access claims, can they constitutionally adjudicate 
FOIA claims at all?213 
Perhaps the 1970s presented uncommon risks to the presidency and 
called for action to prevent congressional supremacy.  On that theory, 
the federal judiciary might have been justified in promoting executive 
privilege while confining legislation like FOIA and FACA.  Opening 
courtrooms could then be described as a defensive maneuver to fore-
stall external regulation, or an unimportant sideshow to the central 
struggle over executive power.  However persuasive this is, the need 
for such judicial intervention changes over time.  If the federal courts 
may legitimately attempt to moderate power swings favoring Con-
gress, the same is probably true when power swings the other way.214  
And if instead the federal courts have no business performing a check-
ing function in this context, then it becomes difficult to defend the ex-
ecutive privilege entrenched by the Supreme Court. 
Nevertheless, considerations of institutional competence probably 
explain, as well as any other factor, our constitutional law of informa-
tion access.  Courts have relied on these ideas, and their reluctance to 
outright design a system of access and secrecy is understandable.215  In-
stitutional competence cannot account for every judicial decision, but it 
has some explanatory power. 
 
III. PLATFORMS FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
 The foregoing explains why access law makes sense in a democracy.  
Some parts of the world use constitutional law and judicial review; 
some parts of our domestic law follow suit.  But it is hard to under-
stand why one piece of our law is judicially enforceable and constitu-
tionally entrenched while another might not be.  Constitutional text is 
not the answer, and history is only a start.  Moreover, defending our 
conventional constitutional order becomes more challenging in light of 
court willingness to engage in large-scale structural reasoning: execu-
tive needs justified executive privilege, and democracy’s needs helped 
                                                 
213 The objection would go beyond Exemption 1.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (exempting 
“records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the 
production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to 
interfere with enforcement proceedings, . . . (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, . . . or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger 
the life or physical safety of any individual”). 
214 Even if there is a systematic difference between threats to secrecy and threats to public 
accountability, along with a good way to measure it (which has not been demonstrated), the 
gap would still have to be substantial enough to warrant categorically different treatments of 
access and secrecy. 
215 Accord supra Part I.B.2. (canvassing foreign court decisions). 
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justify courtroom openness.  But these sorts of justifications sweep 
across institutional boundaries.  So the analysis turned to issues of insti-
tutional competence.  Such practical considerations offered hope for ra-
tionalizing the patterns in U.S. law.  But in this final section, I suggest 
that the hope is false.  There is no practical reason to deny constitu-
tional status and judicial enforcement to public access claims involving 
the executive—if we are prepared to weaken the boundary between 
constitutional and other forms of law. 
 
A. Competence Reexamined 
 There is something missing from the institutional competence ac-
count.  Part of that account turns on the absence of easily ascertainable 
standards for adjudicating public access claims.  This gap in substance 
seemed obvious in Houchins, which dealt with a county jail.  No brand 
of federal law already spelled out the access rules for that situation.  Yet 
federal executive operations look different.  Even if constitutional text is 
equally ambiguous, there are legislative, administrative, and attendant 
judicial standards for resolving this kind of dispute.  FOIA, FACA, ex-
ecutive orders, administrative regulations, and a growing pool of case 
law help adjust the flow of information to the public, despite the pref-
erences of individual executive officials.  Is this relevant to constitu-
tional law and judicial review? 
 One answer is “obviously yes,” but in a way already addressed by 
the institutional competence account.  Recall that it broke into two rea-
sons for judicial abstinence: incapacities within the courts plus alterna-
tives beyond them.  The second reason is grounded in the existence of 
nonjudicial or nonconstitutional mechanisms.  These alternatives are 
cited to ease worries about insufficient disclosure, and thereby under-
cut the need for freestanding constitutional claims.  Hence the two 
component justifications are complementary—judicial incapacity 
heightens the desire for alternative methods of dispute resolution, and 
existing alternatives minimize the demand for a more assertive judicial 
role.  In this respect, it is crucial to understand that statutes like FOIA 
provide standards for public access; but this adds nothing interesting to 
the institutional competence account. 
 The better question is whether the two justifications for judicial reti-
cence can turn on each other—whether the alternatives somehow en-
hance court competence.  And in a practical sense, they do.  Some of the 
alternatives to constitutional claims actually make constitutional inter-
vention more feasible. 
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 Consider first the understandable opposition to standardless judi-
cial action.  If drawn on for constitutional purposes,216 a nonconstitu-
tional system can reduce fears that hundreds of federal judges would 
create their own personal lists of adequate reasons for secrecy.  Among 
other sources, FOIA provides a set of exemptions from the ordinary 
presumption of public access to records.217  Courts could work from 
that set218—adjusting how the statutory and administrative components 
operate, or extending their application to uncovered fields of executive 
action.219  Working from existing nonconstitutional law not only re-
duces concerns about judicial ability to see all legitimate competing in-
terests, it also helps solve the problem of transition from executive 
discretion to court-elaborated standards.  Federal courts might be un-
suited to design a system of access and secrecy from scratch, but they 
do not have to.  Ordinary law could provide a safe baseline. 
Doubts about judicial expertise are also diminished by the current 
nonconstitutional access system.  It already enlists the federal courts.220  
They now have substantial training in adjudicating executive access 
disputes, elaborating on access rules promulgated by other institutions.  
And those rules are by no means self-executing.  The FOIA exemptions 
are examples.  Some of them require tricky case-specific risk assess-
ments;221 others merely refer to generic categories of information that 
can be withheld from public view.222  Experience in ordinary litigation 
makes it more difficult to see the judiciary as a hapless incompetent.  If 
the expertise objection persists, moreover, it seems equally applicable to 
ordinary access statutes.  Sustaining the objection therefore requires us 
to seriously question the constitutionality of judicial involvement with 
                                                 
216 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 83–85 (describing the Indian Supreme Court’s deci-
sion to borrow from executive proposals in order to effectuate a constitutional access norm). 
217 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
218 Cf. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 22 (1998) (distinguishing the statutory access claim at issue 
from the treatment of the accounts clause claim in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 
n. 11 (1974) (dicta) (referring to “general directives” in the Constitution)); Note, The First 
Amendment Right of Access to Government-Held Information: A Re-Evaluation After Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 292, 343 (1982). 
219 See infra Part III.C.3. (presenting limits to FOIA as illustrative).  Application of these fed-
eral standards, modified or not, seems more dangerous with respect to state and local opera-
tions.  Those governments have their own access systems, and federal courts are less likely to be 
familiar with them. 
220 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)–(G). 
221 See, e.g., id. § 552(b)(7)(F) (exempting “records or information compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or 
information . . . could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any in-
dividual”). 
222 See id. § 552(b)(6) (exempting “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclo-
sure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”). 
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the current system.223  The idea that courts are constitutionally barred 
from any part of this decades-long role seems both extravagant and 
without a serious proponent. 
Finally, insofar as institutional competence arguments are based on 
feasibility concerns, existing practice is at least a partial response.  The 
statutory and regulatory system confirms that public access claims are 
manageable, if hardly cost-free.  Annually the executive branch receives 
about three million FOIA and Privacy Act224 requests.  It spends ap-
proximately $320 million responding, with something less than $10 mil-
lion in litigation costs for the 300 to 400 cases filed in court each year.225  
These numbers are significant, and they might increase with the judicial 
elaboration under consideration,226 but these costs are not staggering.  
Experience indicates that it is feasible to open a wide scope of material 
to a virtually unlimited class of potential requestors. 
 These contentions are not enough to recommend judicial interven-
tion.  The practical ability to act is not sufficient reason to do so, unless 
power is confused with legitimacy.  That distinction is where this pro-
ject began.227  If the difference between ability and justification is impor-
tant for restraining executive action in a democracy, it is just as critical 
for evaluating judicial action.  But equally apparent are the fundamen-
tal deficiencies in the institutional competence account.  This explana-
tion for our current practice offers up alternative access systems to 
confirm that judicial intervention is unwarranted.  And yet some of 
those systems relieve judicial burdens.  The existing framework pro-
vides a good start on substance, judicial training, and demonstrated 
feasibility.  The remaining task, then, is to think more broadly about the 
connection of ordinary to constitutional law, and the relationship it fos-
ters between courts and other institutions. 
 
B. Approaches to Systems 
                                                 
223 See also supra note 213 and accompanying text 
224 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), (d) (permitting individuals to request certain records pertaining to 
them and held by agencies); see also id. § 552a(g)(1)(A), (2) (providing for civil suits). 
225 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Information & Privacy, Summary of Annual FOIA Re-
ports for Fiscal Year 2003 (2004), <http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2004foiapost22.htm>.  Even 
with the prospect of recovering attorney’s fees, private party use of FOIA’s litigation opportu-
nity is capped by the procedural costs of pressing on after agency denial.  For one indication of 
benefits—a sample of published news articles making use of FOIA requests—see the National 
Security Archive’s collection at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/stories.htm.  See also 
Sam Dillon & Diana J. Schemo, Charter Schools Fall Short in Public Schools Matchup, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 23, 2004; Eric Lichtblau, Justice Department Opens Inquiry into Abuse of U.S. Detainees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A14. 
226 This would depend on several factors, of course, such as the degree to which entirely 
new claims become available as opposed to existing claims becoming more potent. 
227 See supra Part I.A. 
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 Building the case for modification of the current system depends on 
unconventional thinking.  Constitutional norms must work in conjunc-
tion with sub-constitutional systems.  That this sort of solution has been 
overlooked indicates an open space in ordinary constitutional analysis.  
Thus if constitutional law should be at work in this field, a larger re-
evaluation of the options for judicial intervention is in order.  To get 
that effort started, several conceivable judicial reactions to existing sys-
tems can be identified, each subject to a different set of normative objec-
tions. 
At the extremes, courts might attempt to destroy or entrench an exist-
ing system.  Either is likely to be controversial and practically difficult 
but once in a while the objective might be defended.  On the destruc-
tion side, assisting in the Thirteenth Amendment’s goal of eradicating 
slavery could be a good example.228  Yet no one seems to contend that 
statutes like FOIA and FACA are totally forbidden by the Constitution.  
Courts do, and should, provide some freedom to legislate access.  On 
the entrenchment side, there is even less traction.  The judiciary must 
be confident that the system in question is mandated by the Constitu-
tion, that this version of the system must be impervious to change, and 
that courts should make these assessments.  Rarely will all of this be 
true.  Thus the Constitution plainly contemplates a functioning “Con-
gress of the United States,”229 but no particular committee structure is 
dictated by the language in Article I,230 and no court could defend an in-
junction permanently freeze-framing the current organization.231 
 Less invasive options are available.  The judiciary might practice ab-
stinence, refusing to participate in a system even when called on.232  
Consider the judicially declared boundaries of Article III.  Federal 
courts may avoid difficult issues by imposing requirements for litigant 
standing,233 by refusing to issue advisory opinions,234 and by outsourc-
                                                 
228 But cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (granting enforcement power to Congress). 
229 Id. art. I, § 1; see id. § 4, cl. 2 (requiring Congress to assemble at least once a year). 
230 Cf. id. § 5, cl. 2 (stating that “[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings”). 
231 More modest versions of entrenchment are easier to understand.  For example, courts 
have indicated that long-standing methods or public places for communication should not be 
obliterated by regulation.  See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994); Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 95–98 (1987) (discussing tradition).  In 
these areas the judiciary is not locking in a regulatory regime, but locking down elements of a 
system. 
232 Abstinence might be temporary, allowing for experimentation or data collection before a 
final judicial conclusion is reached.  Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (based on 
an understanding of the goal of the equal protection clause, “race-conscious admissions policies 
must be limited in time”); Vieth v. Jubelierer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1799 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (awaiting “workable standards” for impermissibly partisan gerrymanders).  In the text, I 
refer to more permanent versions. 
233 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63, 573 (1992). 
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ing political questions.235  Abstinence resembles the institutional compe-
tence account, but the fit is imperfect.  The judiciary has not abstained 
from access disputes.  As detailed above, the courts occasionally gener-
ate constitutional law in the field and they regularly adjudicate statu-
tory claims.  Second, the personal injury requirement for Article III 
standing is sufficiently loose that statutory access claims are no longer 
at risk.  This was not always clear.  Federal courts have shied from non-
physical, non-monetary injuries shared by many people—grievances so 
generalized that overtly political institutions might be better suited to 
respond.236  Today, FEC v. Akins237 establishes that Article III standing 
does not prevent adjudication of demands for public disclosure.  In-
formation deprivation, backed by nothing more concrete than the inter-
est of a voter in understanding the political process, is justiciable with 
Congress’s blessing.238  FOIA claims are safe from Article III assaults.239 
 Contrast judicial respect for a system.  This option is less aggressive 
than the first three, and it makes sense for a range of situations in which 
constitutional norms are difficult to find.  On this course the judiciary 
simply defers to the judgment of other actors regarding substance, in-
stitutional choice, and institutional design.  Courts thereby work to 
avoid undermining or embedding a system for which others are re-
sponsible, but they remain free to participate in the system when it so 
demands.  Such respect might be undependable when the design in-
                                                                                                                                
234 See, e.g., Response of the Justices to President Washington (Aug. 8, 1793) (refusing to re-
spond to legal questions posed by the President through his Secretary of State), reprinted in 15 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 111 n.1 (1969); Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792) (re-
printing an opinion and letters by federal judges refusing to participate as courts in a veterans’ 
benefits program). 
235 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  Impeachment is a leading example.  See 
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (refusing to interfere with certain Senate procedures 
for the impeachment “trial” of a federal district judge). 
236 See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576 (“Vindicating the public interest . . . is the function 
of Congress and the Chief Executive.”); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174–79 (1974) 
(denying standing to claim that a statute permitting CIA expenditures to remain secret violated 
the accounts clause); 1 TRIBE, supra note 100, § 3-14, at 387–92; Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 881, 894 (1983). 
237 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
238 See id. at 24–25 (recognizing voter standing to challenge an FEC refusal to require an as-
sociation to disclose information regarding its membership, contributions, and expenditures); 
accord Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989) (holding that fail-
ure to obtain information subject to disclosure under FACA is a distinct injury providing stand-
ing); see also Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 616–
17 (1999) (“[A]t least in information cases, the question of standing is for congressional rather 
than judicial resolution.”). 
239 Whether constitutionally inspired claims are similarly sheltered could be another matter.  
But the notion of judicial platforms, outlined below, is that courts’ use of constitutional law 
sometimes may work from, and only because of, a non-constitutional system generated by oth-
ers. 
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cludes judicial action within it.  A court’s sense of propriety and practi-
cality could well overrun the designers’ plans.  Conceptually, however, 
judicial respect is a discrete alternative.  But federal courts have not 
made this choice in access cases, either.  Executive privilege and re-
straints on FOIA and FACA make it impossible to believe that courts 
are merely enforcing results reached in the political process; as do deci-
sions regulating public access to courts under the First Amendment.  
The judiciary is intervening in the access system, and using constitu-
tional law to do it. 
The last approach is modification.  It is the most difficult to evaluate 
at wholesale because it covers so much: restricting a system’s scope, ex-
tending its reach, or otherwise altering the manner in which it oper-
ates.240  In each form, however, judicial activity is usually more like 
adjusting than redesigning.  While less ambitious than destruction or 
entrenchment, judicial modification is more active than abstinence or 
respect.  Judicially imposed restraints are probably the most recogniz-
able type of system modification.  One was described above: the use of 
constitutional inferences to restrict public access under FOIA and 
FACA.241  Another kind of modification is illustrated by due process re-
quirements.  Federal courts will not mandate cash transfers to the poor, 
for example, but termination of payments may depend on the govern-
ment’s willingness to provide recipients notice and an opportunity to 
be heard.242  Other than additional process, overt judicial “expansion” 
of existing systems is harder to identify.  But it happens.  Enforcing 
constitutional equality norms can have this effect.  Other institutions 
sometimes prefer to grant opportunities (to vote or to receive public 
education or to speak on public property, for example) only to a subset 
of the population on a constitutionally impermissible basis (religion or 
race or political ideology, for example).  If courts forbid such lines, ex-
tension of the opportunities can follow.243  In any event, the judiciary 
regularly modifies non-judicial systems for constitutional purposes.  
And there is no easily detectible rule permitting courts to cut back on 
existing systems, but not to push onward. 
 
C. Platforms 
                                                 
240 By this explanation, I mean to distinguish ordinary statutory interpretation. 
241 See supra Part II.A.1; see also, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. 
(Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982) (exempting a particular political organization from campaign fi-
nance disclosure regulations). 
242 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976). 
243 Extension need not follow.  Sometimes government will be permitted to withdraw the 
benefit altogether. 
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Judicial elaboration from constitutionally optional platforms is a 
generative type of system modification.  Courts would pay attention to 
nonconstitutional systems constructed elsewhere without taking cur-
rent boundaries as given.  As in some foreign nations,244 it involves 
courts building on the work of other institutions, borrowing their ideas 
and using the mechanisms they have constructed, to accomplish consti-
tutional goals that the judiciary could not have attempted otherwise.  
This is different from imposing equality norms.  Equality norms might 
direct legislators to choose “both x and y” or “neither x nor y.”  The 
platform idea amounts to the declaration from courts to nonjudicial ac-
tors: “Now that you have provided a system addressing x, we may in-
voke the Constitution to alter the operations surrounding x, or to add y, 
or to subtract z.”245  It is neither free-form common lawmaking nor sim-
ple legislation.  Can it be defended? 
In considering this question, keep in mind the space occupied by 
judicial platforms.  The idea applies to situations in which existing con-
stitutional norms, for practical reasons, cannot be judicially enforced un-
til nonjudicial actors move toward the constitutional goal.  There are 
countless systems operated without substantial judicial involvement; 
few think courts ought to consciously alter them without constitutional 
cause.  So if secrecy and public access are foreign to the Constitution, 
the argument is over.  This point distinguishes William Eskridge and 
John Ferejohn’s “super-statutes,” which “seek[] to establish a new nor-
mative or institutional framework for state policy.”246  The judicial plat-
forms concept shares the notion that fundamental or constitutional law 
need not be separate from other types of law,247 but it does not entail 
that legislation itself adds to our list of fundamental norms.248  Plat-
forms facilitate judicial implementation of norms drawn from the Con-
stitution, by conventional interpretive method, and these norms are 
new only in that sense.  In this way, judicial platforms are more like 
                                                 
244 See supra Part I.B.2. 
245 The idea can work the other way around.  Nonjudicial institutions might build from a 
platform created by the judiciary.  This is consistent with the virtues of cross-institutional bor-
rowing. 
246 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001) 
(adding that such a statute must also “over time . . . ‘stick’ in the public culture such that . . . the 
super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad effect on the law—
including an effect beyond the four corners of the statute”); see id. at 1275–76.  Another version 
of the idea appeared in Peter M. Shane, Voting Rights and the “Statutory Constitution,” 56 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 244 & n.3, 269 (1993) (exploring statutes, such as the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, that “may lay claim to expressing our fundamental law in a way that entitles them to be 
included within the range of material relevant to constitutional interpretation”); id. at 252 (list-
ing six conditions for such statutes). 
247 See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 246, at 1266. 
248 See id. at 1267–75 (distinguishing Bruce Ackerman’s work on constitutional moments). 
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Gerhard Casper’s “framework legislation”—which implements struc-
tural values already in our Constitution249—but supplemented by some 
form of judicial review.250 
 
1. Forerunners 
 In a general sense, judicial platforms are actually ubiquitous.  All 
federal court action rests on a statutory foundation.  Congress was not 
obligated to create any lower federal courts; their jurisdiction requires 
an affirmative statutory grant; and the Supreme Court’s appellate juris-
diction is subject to statutory exceptions.251  It is perfectly conventional 
to believe that Article III tribunals wield constitutional law only when 
enabled by valid legislation.252  But once Congress designed the basic 
statutory platform on which federal courts operate, it lost discretion to 
dictate outcomes on constitutional issues.253  Judicial use of constitu-
tional law both depends on and enjoys some independence from politi-
cal institutions. 
 In addition, there is no doubt that nonjudicial branches operate in 
constitutional territory shared with courts.  Think about constitutional 
remedies.  The text of the Federal Constitution rarely describes the 
mechanisms for its enforcement,254 and so courts might generate a 
                                                 
249 “By providing for information, consultation, and the legal consequences in cases of dis-
agreement between the [President and the Congress], such legislation provides greater specific-
ity to the notion of legal constraints and attempts to stabilize expectations about the ways in 
which governmental power is exercised.”  Gerhard Casper, The Constitutional Organization of the 
Government, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177, 187–88 (1985), citing Gerhard Casper, Constitutional 
Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
463, 482 (1976); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 107 & n.* (1991). 
250 Cf. HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE 
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 69–72 (1990) (relying on the framework legislation idea and commending 
“balanced institutional participation” that includes courts). 
251 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (indicating that inferior federal courts may be established 
by Congress at its option); id. § 2, cl. 2 (permitting congressionally mandated exceptions to Su-
preme Court appellate jurisdiction); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1922) 
(stressing congressional discretion over federal jurisdiction); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 
441 (1850) (indicating that Congress is free to confer federal jurisdiction short of that authorized 
by Article III, § 2). 
252 There is an old debate about the authority of Congress to strip federal jurisdiction, espe-
cially for constitutional questions.  See RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ch. 4 (5th ed. 
2004).  But nobody seems to argue federal courts could have materialized without congres-
sional action. 
253 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDI-
CIAL POWER 48–49 (2d ed. 1990) (reading United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145–48 
(1872), narrowly to limit Congress’s authority to direct federal courts to apply an independently 
unconstitutional rule); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1373 (1953); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995) (preserving final federal judgments). 
254 An exception is the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
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scheme of remedies in the absence of applicable statutes or administra-
tive regulations.255  And yet federal courts sometimes accept congres-
sional or executive alternatives.  Modern cases are especially reluctant 
to authorize damages remedies when another branch of government 
has spoken to the question.256  At the same time, federal courts have not 
unconditionally retreated.  Even with respect to complex administrative 
dispute resolution systems, and ignoring equitable relief, the Supreme 
Court tests these systems for constitutional adequacy.257  One way to 
understand these cases is to distinguish complete relief for individual 
claimants (which is only sometimes judicially mandated) from “a gen-
eral structure of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government 
within the bounds of law.”258  In this sense, the constitutional remedies 
cases are at least compatible with platforms for judicial elaboration.  Al-
though courts are not always assertive here, multiple entities are work-
ing on the same constitutional problems. 
 With effort, tighter analogs can be found.  Three touch on democ-
ratic structure: disclosure requirements for informal federal rulemak-
ing, state court improvisations on election law, and federal court 
interest in developing a qualified reporters’ privilege.  In these exam-
ples, courts are driven by a sense of constitutional value but their abil-
ity to act alone is plainly restricted. 
In the rulemaking context, the Supreme Court has long held that 
due process does not require a particular form of public participation.259  
Lower courts were apparently unsatisfied.  They began to generate 
public participation requirements for informal federal agency rulemak-
ing, beyond what could be found in the Administrative Procedures 
Act.260  Although these efforts were largely stymied by the Supreme 
                                                 
255 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396–97 (1971) (ad-
dressing damages claims); id. at 400, 404–06 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stressing the traditional 
presumption that equitable relief is available in cases of constitutional violation); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961) (addressing the exclusionary rule). 
256 See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (refusing to require awards of consequen-
tial damages for the improper denial of cash benefits); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (ad-
dressing government employee claims for monetary relief beyond that authorized in ordinary 
law). 
257 See Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 n. 14 (concluding that the nonjudicial scheme was “clearly con-
stitutionally adequate”); see also Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425 (concluding that Congress did not fail 
to provide “meaningful safeguards or remedies”). 
258 Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1736 (1991). 
259 See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (“Where a 
rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that everyone should have 
a direct voice in its adoption.”); accord Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 
465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (claiming that courts could not define and enforce such a right). 
260 See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 
685–705 (5th ed. 2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
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Court,261 federal courts continue to tack on procedural requirements to 
informal rulemaking.  Courts do seem chastened, however, and wisely 
so.  Information disclosure can be inclusive without the cost and dis-
ruption of public rights to cross-examine experts or enter evidence into 
the agency record.  Accordingly courts will sometimes demand that 
agencies disclose data underlying their rulemaking decisions.262  This 
disclosure preference is not easy to see in statutory text, but it does 
comport with some versions of due process and central components of 
democratic accountability.  In this situation, a proper reading of the 
Constitution might not require public participation, but the procedures 
for rulemaking still trigger information disclosure obligations as a judi-
cially mandated supplement. 
Another model comes from state election law.  No one argues that 
state courts should fabricate an entire election code governing ballot ac-
cess, districting, counts and recounts, election contests, and so on.  And 
yet these exercises make up a core feature of democracy.  State legisla-
tures are doing constitutional work with election statutes.  And such 
legislation marks the regulatory starting line but not always the final 
word on election disputes.  Thus state courts sometimes explicitly rec-
ognize that the legislature is operating within the area of constitutional 
values and, at least partly for that reason, become assertive in adjudi-
cating election law cases.263  Courts are aptly situated to tweak statutory 
and administrative systems as a way of promoting given constitutional 
norms, without appropriating the system outright.  This is not an un-
                                                                                                                                
29, 61–65 (1985) (attributing the judicial innovations to a form of statutory interpretation or 
common law, rather than constitutional law). 
261 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (“But such circumstances, if they exist, are extremely rare.”); id. at 542–
43 & n. 16; see generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.2 
(2d ed. 2001) (emphasizing the problem of agency decision costs). 
262 See, e.g., National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016, 1023 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing 
nondisclosure as one reason for remand to the agency); 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE 434–38, 496–97 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing adequate public notice of rulemaking 
and agency explanation); see also Solite Corp. v. EPA, 952 F.2d 473, 499–500 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  An 
important but pre-Vermont Yankee case is Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (“It is not consonant with the purpose of a rulemaking proceeding to promul-
gate rules on the basis of inadequate data, or on data that, [in] critical degree, is known only to 
the agency.”). 
263 See, e.g., Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1236–37 (Fla. 
2000) (imposing a relaxed deadline for certain recounts in light of a state constitutional right to 
vote), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000), on re-
mand, Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000).  Some state 
courts have declared that their election statutes must be construed liberally to enfranchise vot-
ers.  See, e.g., In re Gray-Sadler, 164 N.J. 468, 474–75, 753 A.2d 1101, 1105 (2000) (referring to con-
stitutional law and statutory objectives of enfranchisement, deterring fraud, and protecting 
ballot secrecy); Appeal of James, 377 Pa. 405, 408, 105 A.2d 64, 66 (1954).  Sometimes the canon 
is codified.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-103 (2000). 
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wavering pattern and the idea surely was controversial even before 
Bush v. Gore.264  Judicial elaboration from election statutes nevertheless 
survives.265 
Judicial experience with a reporter’s privilege is a final example.  
Despite Branzburg, many lower federal courts recognize a qualified 
privilege for reporters who object to disclosing the identity of their 
sources.266  Although it is not always clear whether and why this privi-
lege is based on the First Amendment rather than federal common law, 
a few courts have taken into account federal guidelines on prosecuto-
rial demands for information from the news media.267  In general, these 
guidelines require consideration of need and alternative sources, nego-
tiation, and permission from the Attorney General before compulsory 
process is used against journalists in either civil or criminal proceed-
ings.  Borrowing from that process and those standards can help ensure 
that court-preferred rules are at least feasible.  The guidelines were not 
                                                 
264 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (contending that the Florida state 
courts had departed from the state statutory scheme sufficiently to violate Article II). 
265 See, e.g., Gaddis v. McCullough, 827 N.E.2d 66, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Dobbyn 
v. Rogers, 225 Ind. 525, 544–45, 76 N.E.2d 570, 582 (1948) (“We should at all times have before 
us the fundamental principle that no voter should be deprived of his franchise for the infringe-
ment of any technical requirements in casting his ballot.”)); Tillis v. Wright, No. 32044, 2004 WL 
3403646 (W. Va. July 7, 2005) (addressing ballot access for party-nominated candidates); cf. Er-
landson v. Kiffmeyer, 659 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. 2003) (involving access to absentee ballots). 
266 See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.2d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases, though 
denying protection on the facts); LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 
(4th Cir. 1986) (civil context); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76–77 (2d Cir.) (involving a 
subpoena from a criminal defendant), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); see also Gonzales v. Na-
tional Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999) (setting out a test for protecting non-confidential 
information, though leaving a First Amendment basis for the privilege unclear).  But cf. In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965 (D.C. Cir.) (denying a First Amendment 
privilege and holding that any common-law privilege was qualified and overcome in this case, 
involving a grand jury investigation into the leak of a CIA operative’s identity), cert. denied, 125 
S. Ct. 2977 (2005). 
267 See In re Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358, 370–71 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (noting the court’s considera-
tion and the prosecution’s alleged violation of 28 CFR § 50.10), aff’d by an equally divided court, 
963 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295, 296–97 (S.D. Fla. 
1982) (indicating that the guideline “must” be followed by the United States, in addition to the 
similar demands of a court-articulated qualified privilege); Maurice v. NLRB, 7 Media L. Rep. 
2221, 2224 (S.D. W. Va. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 691 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1982); Adam Liptak, 
The Hidden Federal Shield Law, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 227, 232–33; see also Baker v. F & F In-
vestment, 470 F.2d 778, 781–82 (2d Cir. 1972) (post-Branzburg) (indicating approval of the dis-
trict court’s reference to state shield statutes to inform federal policy).  A prior version of the 
regulation was used in Branzburg as a reason to deny a reporter’s privilege under the First 
Amendment.  See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706–07 (1972) (“These rules . . . may prove 
wholly sufficient to resolve the bulk of disagreements and controversies between press and 
federal officials.”).  For contentions that the regulation is too weak in the hands of executive of-
ficials, and may be underinclusive in its application to the category of “journalists,” see Jennifer 
Elrod, Protecting Journalists from Compelled Disclosure: A Proposal For a Federal Statute, 7 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 154–58 (2004). 
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written for judicial enforcement, of course.268  But we are not automati-
cally beyond the realm of constitutional law just because a nonjudicial 
actor creates a rule of decision that is compatible with judicial opinion.  
Concluding otherwise indefensibly equates courts with constitutional 
law, while depriving the former of useful sources for practical imple-
mentation of the latter. 
 
2. Warnings 
While it is wrong to insulate constitutional law from other law, we 
do need a standard that distinguishes acceptable elaboration from dan-
gerous flights of fancy.  Courts often (and thankfully) refuse to super-
impose constitutional law on existing systems.  In the federal courts, 
social welfare cases are poignant examples.269  The problem is not sim-
ply an ethereal conception of legitimate court action.  Ill-advised judi-
cial intervention can do real-world damage.  And because platforms are 
solutions to pragmatic limits on judicial action, a range of practical con-
cerns deserves attention. 
First is the persistent risk of unintended consequences.  Complex-
systems theorists warn that, for certain types of systems, even discrete 
interventions can have nonlinear effects.270  If courts are incompetent to 
outright design the relevant system, there is reason to doubt their abil-
ity to skillfully tinker with it.271  Part of the worry is the feasibility of 
modifications, and another part might be fiscal. 
Second, plausible nonjudicial responses should be assessed.  The 
modifications under consideration, at least in the first instance, are be-
yond the control of Congress and the executive.  If these institutions are 
aware that a system can become a platform for court creativity, they 
might not construct it in the first place.  Net-positive systems might 
never be initiated—or be abolished once judicial modification becomes 
apparent. 
                                                 
268 See 28 CFR § 50.10(n) (denying intent to create or recognize legally enforceable rights); In 
re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 853–54 (4th Cir. 1992) (alternative holding); In re Special Counsel Investi-
gation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 32 (D.D.C. 2004) (same).  Justice Department employees may be ad-
ministratively sanctioned for violations, however. 
269 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41–44 (1973) (refusing to in-
terfere with public school financing systems to try to equalize educational opportunity); 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (declining to recognize a constitutional guarantee of 
adequate housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (upholding caps on welfare 
payments to families); infra text accompanying notes 296–297. 
270 See, e.g., AUYANG, supra note 10, at 234 (describing nonlinearity); Charles J. Kibert, Green 
Buildings: An Overview of Progress, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVT’L L. 491, 494 (2004) (discussing cli-
mate); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A 
Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 854 
(1996). 
271 Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 11 (stressing that courts are complex-system participants). 
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Third, reliance on judicial modification can turn into an unhealthy 
dependence on the courts.  In the long run, it is almost by definition 
better that democracies solve most public problems through nonadju-
dicatory politics.  Recurrent court fixes for errant systems, even if suc-
cessful within each system, might end up damaging democracy.  Such 
rescues could lower the stakes of ordinary politics, and thereby 
dampen any existing commitment to careful design by politicians and 
civil servants. 
Finally, courts should look for a demonstrated need.  This follows 
from the dangers identified.  Taking these risks seriously entails the 
ability to target a significant achievement that could result from judicial 
intervention.  At the same time, willingness to endorse departures from 
existing systems should be a function of the mission’s importance.  A 
less dispensable objective will increase tolerance for experimentation, if 
the goal is otherwise in jeopardy. 
Each of these considerations suggests that platforms ought to be 
used with caution—not only as to the form of judicial modification, but 
also in selecting occasions for any improvisation at all. 
 
3. Translucent government 
 The discussion above amounts to an analytical structure for evaluat-
ing the usefulness of judicial platforms.  It can be outlined in four 
points.  First, a constitutional value must be at stake.  If it is, the issue is 
how best to implement that value.  Second, a practical problem must un-
dercut the ability of courts to elaborate or enforce the constitutional 
norm.  Otherwise, courts might simply exercise independent judgment.  
Third, an existing system must help solve the hindrance to judicial par-
ticipation.  If there is no such platform, nothing will be gained by point-
ing to intervention by others.  And fourth, the possible dangers of judicial 
action must be considered.  Unintended adverse consequences, back-
lash or other problematic nonjudicial response, and an unbalanced reli-
ance on litigation over ordinary politics should be accounted for and 
compared to the need for action and the significance of the objective.  
These four inquiries might be used in a number of fields—from voting 
rights, to campaign finance, to welfare reform—where they can pro-
duce quite different conclusions.  For present purposes, the question is 
public access to information about the executive.  Much of the case for 
using platforms in that context has now been made. 
 For both executive secrecy and public access, which are points along 
a single axis, constitutional status turns on structural logic.  Every de-
mocracy develops a system for distributing and withholding informa-
tion about government operations.  Popular accountability depends on 
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information access, while effective and sensible action requires secrecy 
on occasion.272  In addition, information about government facilitates a 
central function of the First Amendment: public discussion of political 
issues.  And a law of access provides guidelines rather than relying on 
individualized official discretion.  These ideas are reflected in the con-
stitutional text and practices of many new democracies;273 and they are 
embedded in our own governmental order.  U.S. courts already under-
stand this.  They have invoked structural and democratic arguments to 
justify restrictions on access statutes, along with openness in judicial 
proceedings.274 
 A contrary conclusion—that, at least in general, our Constitution 
has nothing to do with secrecy or access—might be possible.  If that is 
correct, however, executive privilege and any other implied constitu-
tional protection for government secrecy would be on the chopping 
block.  It is also conceivable that executive discretion to withhold in-
formation is more critical to executive operations than public disclosure 
is to democratic governance.  But this is a very ambitious claim with 
contestable normative and descriptive aspects.275  In any event, the con-
temporary dispute is more about the propriety of judicial intervention 
than the fundamental or constitutional character of the values in con-
troversy.276 
 Platforms fit this dispute.  Critics on and off the bench assert that 
courts are incompetent to grapple with the delicate issues of informa-
tion access.  Setting aside the legitimacy of executive privilege, judicial 
design of an access system does seem difficult at best.  But a foundation 
already exists.  As detailed above,277 statutes and regulations can be 
used as a baseline for substantive judgment; they have been the basis 
for judicial training in the field, and they indicate that widespread pub-
lic access rights are feasible and valuable.  Of course, borrowing from 
nonjudicial sources to construct constitutional law departs from some 
traditional thinking.  But the integration of constitutional and noncon-
stitutional law can be powerfully useful and it is not entirely new,278 
even if it is largely unheralded. 
Because judicial intervention might produce undesirable conse-
quences, however, access advocates should identify a substantial need 
                                                 
272 See supra Part I.A. 
273 See supra Part I.B. 
274 See supra Part II.A. 
275 See supra notes 212–214 and accompanying text. 
276 See supra Part II.C. 
277 See supra Part III.A. 
278 See supra Part III.C.1. 
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for reform.279  This is a challenging task, foremost because information 
outsiders have no good way of measuring what is being withheld.  
Moreover, the optimal substantive standards for access are not a matter 
of consensus.  On the other hand, waiting for a (possibly fanciful) 
global measure of adequate access is a mistake.  Instead we should be-
gin with a sensible skepticism about the government’s use of informa-
tion,280 and then look for particular deficiencies in the formal system for 
resolving access disputes.  Although my purpose is not to detail every 
shortcoming in the existing system, attention to a few specifics is useful 
and consistent with a lower-level focus that courts should be using.  
Anyway, using a nonjudicial platform forecloses full-scale restructuring 
by the courts. 
The least likely candidate for greater access, in my view, is executive 
deliberation.  In its simple form, deliberation formulates a course of ac-
tion without executing it.  Permitting the executive, like Congress and 
the courts, to choose who participates has obvious value and little im-
mediate threat to the public at large.  Certainly there are risks of unto-
ward behavior here.  But for all the complaints about the energy and 
health care policy task forces, the executive gained openness within the 
deliberations, which resulted in proposals subject to public critique and 
prolonged debate.281 
Access to other sorts of information is another matter.  Using FOIA 
as an example, four weaknesses stand out.  First, the statute is mistitled.  
It is not a freedom of “information” law.  It only reaches agency “re-
cords.”  The definition thereof is subject to interpretation but it most 
clearly refers to surviving artifacts of past communication.282  Thus the 
statute is not a tool for obtaining explanations from government offi-
cials, or for receiving aggregate data as yet unassembled, no matter 
how publicly important the issue.283  Second, these records must be in 
the possession of the executive.  Individuals can move records beyond 
                                                 
279 See supra Part III.C.2. 
280 See supra Part I.A.  Concerns should probably be heightened when opposition parties 
lack important tools for executive oversight, such as congressional subpoenas.  One-party gov-
ernment can be more productive but it also weakens nonjudicial mechanisms of disclosure. 
281 See NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 3-8 (2001), 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf> (discussing oil drilling in 
Alaska, and displaying a photograph of what appear to be antelope grazing in front of a power 
plant); Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 900–01 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (discussing the deliberations of the Task Force on National Health Care Reform and its 
mission to present a proposal to the President, which later failed in Congress). 
282 See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161–62 (1975) (indicating that FOIA 
does not obligate agencies to create records). 
283 Cf. Judith Resnick, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puz-
zles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIR. L.S. 783, 797–98 (2004) (explaining that research-
ers must collect data about administrative adjudication agency-by-agency). 
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FOIA’s reach by removing them to a privately controlled location284—or 
by destroying them.  Such conduct might well violate the Federal Re-
cords Act,285 but that legislation lacks a private right of action.286  Third, 
parts of the executive are categorically off-limits to FOIA requests.  The 
White House staff is a prominent exclusion,287 and the executive’s ad-
vantage in Exemption 1 cases is stifling.  Finally, even if FOIA and its 
judicial implementation hit the appropriate degree of public access, the 
system is subject to roll back.  The most recent directive from the Attor-
ney General is to be more careful about disclosure;288 and in Fiscal Year 
2003, the Justice Department invoked about 140 statutes as specific au-
thority to withhold records under FOIA’s Exemption 3.289  Absent con-
stitutional protection, that number has no ceiling. 
These limitations justify judicial action, given the right case and 
conditions.  Removing documents from the executive does not neces-
                                                 
284 See Kissinger v. Reporters’ Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 154–55 (1980); 
United We Stand Am., Inc. v. IRS, 359 F.3d 595 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (explaining that “agency re-
cords” must be created or obtained by an agency, as well as in the agency’s control); see also 
United States Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1989) (distinguishing per-
sonal items of government employees); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton, 880 F. Supp. 1, 11 
(D.D.C. 1995) (explaining that staff notes “ordinarily need not be disclosed unless they are in-
tended for distribution through normal agency channels or can be said to be within the ‘control 
or dominion’ of an agency”). 
285 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3107, 3301–3314; see also id. §§ 2101 et seq. (Presidential Records Act). 
286 See Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 148 (regarding improper removal of records).  But cf. American 
Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 40–41 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (attempting to distinguish 
Kissinger, and permitting APA review to prevent destruction of documents by agencies charged 
with enforcing the records retention statutes). 
287 The statute specifies the “Executive Office of the President,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(e), but was 
apparently not intended to reach “the President’s immediate personal staff or units in the Ex-
ecutive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the President.”  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 
1380, at 14–15 (1974); see Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156 (endorsing this limitation); Armstrong v. Ex-
ecutive Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 557–59 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the National 
Security Council is not an “agency” subject to FOIA, and listing other like entities). 
288 See Memorandum of Attorney General John Ashcroft Regarding the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (Oct. 12, 2001), <http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2001foiapost19.htm> (“When 
you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole or in part, you 
can be assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a 
sound legal basis . . . .”). 
289 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (stating that “[t]his section does not apply to matters that are . . . spe-
cifically exempted from disclosure by statute” if the statute leaves no discretion to disclose or 
“establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be 
withheld”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Information & Privacy, Summary of Annual FOIA Re-
ports for Fiscal Year 2003, <http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2004foiapost22.htm> (quantifying 
agency use of Exemption 3).  Exemption 3 statutes are scattered throughout the U.S. Code.  A 
regularly used provision is 41 U.S.C. § 253b(m) (prohibiting release of certain proposals for 
government contracts).  A troubling provision is part of the Ethics in Government Act, 5 U.S.C. 
App. 4 § 107(a)(2) (prohibiting release of conflict of interest disclosure statements from certain 
part-time and temporary government employees, where an administrative regulation requires 
these statements).  See Meyerhoff v. EPA, 958 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1992) (unanimously conclud-
ing that conflict of interest disclosures required of EPA science advisors could be withheld, but 
splintering over the grounds). 
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sarily remove knowledge of wrongdoing or controversial action.  At 
some point public accountability will dictate the inconvenience of offi-
cials explaining their actions rather than simply disclosing remnants of 
an official record.  Similar problems follow from exempting parts of the 
executive from public access regulation.  The statutes and court-made 
constitutional law already protect most high-level deliberation and na-
tional security-related information.  A flat prohibition on all formal in-
formation requests does save the work of articulating reasons for 
nondisclosure.  But the articulation itself is a useful exercise, and the 
difference between zero access under current law and partial access 
under FOIA and its exemptions does not seem devastating.  This is par-
ticularly true when congressional oversight is slack.  Perhaps equally 
important are lower-level operations and the proliferation of statutory 
exceptions.  Judicial recognition of a constitutional access norm can halt 
unjustified retrogression of statutory access rights.  Finally, courts 
themselves bear responsibility for neutering FOIA in the Exemption 1 
context.  This overcommitment is present in the 9/11 detainee records 
case, in which judicial scrutiny was essentially absent.290  Often judicial 
deference is appropriate.  But the operation of Exemption 1 has crossed 
into a constitutional danger zone, especially considering widespread 
agreement that the executive classifies too much information in the first 
place.291 
As for the dangers identified above—unintended consequences, ef-
fects on nonjudicial actors, and an undue dependence on courts292—
they seem manageable in this context.  Some measure of unforeseen ef-
fects of intervention is probably unavoidable.  Complex systems theory 
should not, however, be converted into automatic opposition to judicial 
intervention—a conclusion that would counsel repudiation of executive 
privilege as much as judicially crafted extensions of access claims.  
Given court experience with the existing access system, and confining 
judicial intervention to modest attempts at reform, significant injury to 
the system can be prevented. 
The deterrence problem might be defused in two ways.  First, judi-
cial enhancement of public information about executive operations is 
unlikely to generate serious political backlash.  Legislation like FOIA 
can take years or decades to enact because of executive resistance; but 
                                                 
290 See Center for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920, 932 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (relying on a law enforcement exemption and relatively conclusory paper dec-
larations from executive officials), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimal-
ism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 61–62 (describing the decision as an instance of “National 
Security Maximalism”). 
291 See supra note 139. 
292 See supra Part III.C.2. 
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despite continuing presidential objections, access legislation is politi-
cally difficult to confront and seriously circumscribe in Congress.  Sec-
ond, judicial modifications could be made subject to legislative or even 
executive revision.  They might be the kind of constitutional common 
law that should not qualify for entrenchment by judicial preference 
alone.293  Although not without controversy, federal courts at times 
have established such norms.  Leading examples are dormant com-
merce clause jurisprudence, Miranda warnings,294 and the prudential 
strand of standing doctrine.295  When this mutable form of doctrine is 
generated, both judicial mistakes and ex ante deterrence of nonjudicial 
system building become less troubling. 
Finally, the threat to vibrant democratic politics is less severe in this 
situation, even if judicial modifications are irreversible.  The object of 
intervention is to improve public access to information about govern-
ment operations.  There is good reason to believe ordinary politics can-
not always maintain a well-functioning political system, one that 
subjects people in power to adequate scrutiny and accountability with-
out seriously impeding executive functions. 
Contrast situations in which the reliance on platforms is tougher to 
defend.  Social welfare rights—such as income support, education, 
housing, and healthcare—are useful for this purpose.  Here the pres-
ence of a constitutional norm is at least equally debatable.  One might 
believe that democracy will fail unless members of the polity are ade-
quately paid, educated, and so forth.  At the same time, explicit protec-
tion of property rights is among the reasons for reaching something like 
the opposite conclusion.296  As with information access, it is difficult to 
                                                 
293 Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(1975) (exploring “a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their 
inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions”); id. at 
29 (explaining that “constitutional common law contains built-in safeguards—where the 
Court’s rule is perceived to have gone too far, it can be rejected or modified by the political 
process without the necessity of a constitutional amendment”).  Professor Monaghan suggested 
that the category of constitutional common law could itself depend on the presence of “debat-
able policy choices or uncertain empirical foundations.”  Id. at 34; see also Dan T. Coenen, A 
Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch 
Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1737–53 (2001). 
294 See Monaghan, supra note 293, at 2, 15–17, 20–21; South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. 
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87–88 (1984) (confirming congressional authority to permit state regula-
tion that would otherwise flunk the Court’s dormant commerce clause doctrine); Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (“[U]nless we are shown other procedures which are at least as 
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous op-
portunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed.”); see also Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000). 
295 See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 
544, 551, 558 (1996). 
296 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (regarding takings and due process); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 
(discussing the problem of faction and property rights); CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTER-
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imagine courts independently designing a system of social welfare; and 
yet nonjudicial actors have created an elaborate system for providing 
these benefits, relying on both public and private resources.  There are, 
however, other important differences in these systems. 
Even if we should grant that minimum welfare is an existing com-
mitment within the United States Constitution, judicial intervention 
into social welfare systems is more difficult as a practical matter.  Cur-
rent systems reflect priority choices and resource constraints that are 
more brittle than comparable choices about information access.  Gov-
ernments must choose not only a mix of public and private market ap-
proaches to social welfare, but also an appropriate level of funding in 
light of these and other commitments.297  Information works differently.  
The game does not so closely approach zero-sum.  With current com-
munications technology, access for one quickly becomes access for all.  
Operating information access systems requires public resources, of 
course, but the trade-offs are less taxing.  The platform for social wel-
fare rights is less stable.  If elaboration from nonjudicial platforms is de-
fensible in any instance, public access is one. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our approach to government secrecy and public access is flawed.  It 
incorporates poorly reconciled patches of constitutional law, accompa-
nied by theoretical justifications that could support either full-press 
constitutionalization or complete judicial retreat.  In this Article, I have 
claimed that constitutional law and judicial review can play a positive 
role in mediating the demands of access and the conditions for execu-
tive efficacy.  That role requires recognition that both secrecy and 
openness are indispensable components of a successful democracy, and 
that the test for judicial intervention should take account of existing 
nonconstitutional access systems.  Both of these lessons are reflected in 
the law and practices of many new democracies. 
                                                                                                                                
PRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 14–18 (1913); cf. Fallon, supra note 27, at 
1808–09 & n. 78 (noting that social welfare rights are not directly addressed, and that their in-
clusion in constitutional law is philosophically debatable). 
297 See SAGER, supra note 19, at 87 (wondering how, to what extent, and by whom medical 
care should be provided and funded); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UN-
FINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 210–13, 227–29 (2004); Mark 
Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1896–97 (2004) 
(specifying an argument against judicially enforceable social welfare rights that emphasizes 
large budgetary consequences and displacement of politically selected priorities); see also Helen 
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999) (suggesting justifications and forms for state court enforcement of 
state social welfare rights). 
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Yet the pertinence of existing systems turns out to be nonobvious.  
Contentions about judicial incompetence are not perfectly aligned with 
the viability of nonjudicial alternatives.  In certain respects, these two 
arguments conflict.  The largely successful operation of a legislative and 
administrative system for public access offers practical opportunities 
for judicial elaboration, rather than an easy reason to forbid it.  The gen-
eral issue—how courts should interact with systems generated by oth-
ers—requires ongoing attention.  But information access is one field 
where that relationship enables legitimate, desirable, and feasible judi-
cial assistance. 
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